Wednesday, June 24, 2026

Checque of security


 

 

     سیکیورٹی چیک کا قانونی مقام


⚖️ ضمانتی چیک پر دفعہ 489-F کا اطلاق نہیں ہوتا — سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کا اہم فیصلہ (2024 SCMR 1567)


سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان نے 2024 SCMR 1567 (Muhammad Anwar v. The State) میں ایک نہایت اہم قانونی اصول واضح کیا ہے کہ محض کسی شخص کے پاس چیک کا ہونا یا چیک کا اجرا ہونا، بذاتِ خود تعزیراتِ پاکستان کی دفعہ 489-F کے تحت جرم ثابت کرنے کے لیے کافی نہیں۔

عدالتِ عظمیٰ نے قرار دیا کہ دفعہ 489-F کے اطلاق کے لیے درج ذیل بنیادی عناصر کا موجود ہونا ضروری ہے:

✅ چیک بدنیتی (Dishonest Intent) کے ساتھ جاری کیا گیا ہو۔

✅ چیک کسی قرض، واجب الادا رقم یا قانونی مالی ذمہ داری (Obligation) کی ادائیگی کے لیے دیا گیا ہو۔

✅ چیک بینک سے ڈس آنر (Dishonour) ہو گیا ہو۔

سپریم کورٹ نے مقدمہ کے ریکارڈ کا جائزہ لینے کے بعد یہ مشاہدہ کیا کہ متعلقہ چیک کسی قرض یا مالی ذمہ داری کی ادائیگی کے لیے جاری نہیں کیا گیا تھا بلکہ معاہدے کے تحت بطور ضمانت (Security/Guarantee) دیا گیا تھا۔ مزید یہ کہ شکایت کنندہ یہ ثابت کرنے میں بھی ناکام رہا کہ اس نے ملزم کو رقم ادا کی تھی یا کوئی ایسی مالی ذمہ داری موجود تھی جس کی ادائیگی کے لیے چیک جاری کیا گیا ہو۔

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ جب چیک صرف بطور سکیورٹی یا گارنٹی دیا گیا ہو اور اس کے بدلے کوئی قابلِ ادائیگی قرض یا ذمہ داری ثابت نہ ہو تو دفعہ 489-F کے ضروری اجزاء پورے نہیں ہوتے۔ چنانچہ سپریم کورٹ نے ملزم کی قبل از گرفتاری ضمانت (Pre-Arrest Bail) منظور کرتے ہوئے اسے ریلیف فراہم کیا۔

قانونی نکتہ:

"ضمانتی (Security) چیک اور ادائیگی (Payment) کے چیک میں فرق کو ہمیشہ مدنظر رکھا جائے گا۔ صرف چیک کا ڈس آنر ہونا دفعہ 489-F کے تحت جرم قائم کرنے کے لیے کافی نہیں، بلکہ اس کا کسی واجب الادا قرض یا مالی ذمہ داری سے تعلق ثابت کرنا بھی ضروری ہے۔"

📖 حوالہ: 2024 SCMR 1567

Muhammad Anwar v. The State

سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان۔

Friday, May 22, 2026

Check Meter

 Check Meter چیک میٹر 

     https://youtu.be/OuPczSIEIpw?si=zp767zSq-3ncSTGI


Sunday, May 17, 2026

Voluntary Said


  https://youtu.be/N42luhBJQiw 

                Legal Tv hd


          P L D 2024 Sindh 289

Cross-examination.

•√Voluntary statement---Scope---Voluntary statement by a witness in cross-examination has no legal evidentiary value---Witness is not permitted to foist into his answer, any statement/material which is not in answer to or explanatory of his answer to the questions put to him---Such voluntary evidence is denominated as "irresponsive" testimony and introduction of such evidence is against the rule of re-examination as contemplated under Art.133 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.

•2003 Y L R 406

Voluntary statement by a witness in cross‑examination has no legal evidentiary value‑‑‑Witness is not permitted to foist into his answer statement any material which is not in answer to or explanatory of his answer to the questions put to him‑‑‑Such voluntary evidence is denominated as "irresponsive" testimony and the introduction of such evidence shall be against the rule of re­-examination as contemplated under Art.133 of Qanun‑e‑Shahadat, 1984‑‑‑Principles.

•According to Article 133 of the Qanun‑e‑Shahadat Order, 1984, the order of examination of witnesses has been set down. The witnesses shall be first examined‑in‑chief and then if the adverse party so desires shall be cross‑examined. The re‑examination, however, is limited to the explanation of matters referred to in‑cross‑examination and if permission in this respect is granted by the Court. It would thus, be seen that the voluntary statement by a witness in cross-­examination has no legal evidentiary value. It is not permissible for a witness to foist into his answer statement any material which is not in answer to or explanatory of his answer to the questions put to him. In jurisprudence, such voluntary evidence is denominated as "irresponsive" testimony and the introduction of such evidence shall be against the rule of re‑examination as contemplated under Article 133 of the Qanun‑e‑Shahadat Order, 1984.

Saturday, January 3, 2026

Strike by Lawyers

               




 


                   2023 SCMR 421

 Strikes by lawyers causing delay in of trial Breach of Fundamental rights of accused --- Accused person like any other has the inalienable right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law ' but if advocates strike and trials are postponed this constitutional right of the accused is negated. 
If the trial of a detained accused is delayed on account of strike (s), and subsequently , the accused is acquitted then the additional incarceration suffered by the accused would have been detrimental to his liberty. 
•••√Prestige of the legal profession should not be undermined by advocates who strike for a lesser cause than to protect and defend the Constitution in the public interest.
  •Courts are the only place where it is believed that justice is administered, and that is why people approach them to get justice and their rights. But, regrettably in Pakistan, the situation is contrary to it, for there is neither the rule of law nor is quick justice provided to the common man.
•Unfortunately, despite the backlog of millions of cases and the judiciary’s ranking at 130 out of 139 in the World Justice Project Ranking, the clashes between judges and the bar members have not reduced.
•The courts in Malir are a case in point, where the strike by bar against the conduct and administration of a district judge recently led to a halt in proceedings in all cases. Such a rift between the bench and the bar affects only the people who, despite their harsh economic conditions, take time out and wait outside the courts from 8am, hoping that it would be the day when they would get at least an inch closer to getting justice. But that does not happen often.
• 2023 SCMR 421, held that the strikes by “lawyers for their personal means consequently injures the fundamental rights i.e. right of due process of law, fair trial, liberty, right of equal protection of law guaranteed by the Constitution, of an accused, who is behind the bar, are violated”.
•Besides, it also held that the “prestige of the legal profession should not be undermined by the advocates who strike for a lesser cause than to protect and defend the Constitution in the public interest”.
•The lawyers should refrain from holding strikes, and, if they do, the authorities should take necessary steps to overcome this issue in the larger public interest.

Wednesday, March 12, 2025

Execution of dower


       https://youtu.be/QUbhAibQMIg



اگر فیملی کورٹ عورت کا دعوٰی تنسیخ نکاح بربنائے خلع بشرط واپسی حق مہر ڈگری کرتی ہے تو شوہر اسی ڈگری کی بنیاد پر حق مہر کی واپسی کیلئے اجرا دائر کرسکتا ہے

2023 C L C 1285


Return/recovery of dower---Execution petition---Maintainability---Scope---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula was decreed subject to return of dower---Four tolas of gold ornaments was fixed as dower duly entered in Column of Nikah Nama---Executing Court turned down the objection of respondent/ex-wife that execution petition for recovery of Zar-e-Khulla was not maintainable---Appellate Court accepted the version/objection of respondent by allowing her revision petition---Held, that the decision of dissolution of marriage in terms of S.10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, was compound, which on the one hand dissolved the marriage inter se parties and, on the other, said dissolution was made subject to return of dower---Manner and form of decree was prescribed in Rr. 16 and 17 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965, in light of which dissolution of marriage, on the basis of Khula subject to return of dower was a decree for all intent and purposes under S.13 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, and thus was executable---

JUDGMENT---This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 stems out from judgment dated 22nd September, 2016, whereby the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, while allowing the revision petition filed by respondent No.3 (hereinafter referred to as "respondent") set aside the order dated 6th February, 2016 passed by the learned Judge Family Court/ Executing Court, Rawalpindi.

2.    Facts in brief necessary for adjudication of instant petition are that the petitioner was married to the "respondent". On account of differences, a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula was instituted by the "respondent", which was decreed by way of judgment dated 8th December, 2010, subject to return of dower. The petitioner moved an execution petition seeking return of dower. The execution petition was though objected by the "respondent", however, by way of order dated 6th February, 2016, the objection was turned down and the "respondent" was directed to hand over 4-tola gold in shape of ornaments or its price at the prevailing market rate. Feeling dissatisfied, the "respondent" filed a revision petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, which was accepted through impugned judgment on the ground that execution petition was not competent, in the circumstances.

3.    After having heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, I have perused the record.

4.    After having remained in marital tie for some time with the petitioner, the "respondent" in order to part her ways, instituted a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula before the learned Judge Family Court, Rawalpindi. On failure of pre-trial reconciliation proceedings, suit was finally decreed by way of order dated 8th December, 2010 with the following observations: -  

  "3. Considering pre-trial reconciliation proceedings to be failed under proviso of Section 10(4) of Family Courts Act 1964, suit of the plaintiff for dissolution of marriage is hereby decreed on the basis of Khullah, subject to return of dower…"

(Underlining supplied for emphasis)

5.    This followed an execution petition on behalf of petitioner for the return of 4-tola of gold as part of dower. The "respondent" resisted the execution proceedings and by way of order dated 22nd November, 2011, she was directed to return the four tolas gold ornaments mentioned in Nikahnama or its price mentioned in the receipt at the time of Nikah. Feeling dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred revision petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, which was allowed by way of judgment dated 2nd April, 2012. The "respondent" then filed W.P.No.3002 of 2012, which was accepted with the consent of the parties by way of order dated 15th May, 2015 in the following manner:-

 "With the consensus of the parties, this petition is accepted and set aside the orders dated 25.11.2011 and 02.04.2012 passed by the learned trial Court, with a direction to the learned Executing Court to decide the application of the respondent afresh keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in titled "Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood and another" (2013 SCMR 1049).

6.    In post remand proceedings, the learned Judge Family Court/ Executing Court, by way of order dated 6th February, 2016, directed the "respondent" to hand over 4-tola gold in shape of ornaments or its price at the prevailing market value while discarding her objections. This prompted the "respondent" to file the revision petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, which was allowed through impugned judgment.

7.    It appears from the impugned judgment that the revision petition was accepted on the sole ground that for the recovery of "Zar-e-Khula" in a suit for dissolution of marriage, execution petition was not maintainable. Reliance to this effect was placed on Mst. Nadia Bibi v. Additional District Judge and others (PLD 2013 Lahore 41). From the perusal of the judgment in the case of (Mst. Nadia Bibi) supra; it clearly reveals that in the said matter suit for dissolution of marriage was decreed and marriage was dissolved on the basis of Khula without any condition. In this backdrop, it was held that as there was no decree in favour of respondent No.2 in the petition, so execution proceedings are not maintainable.

8.    The facts in the present case on the contrary are altogether different. In this case, the learned Judge Family Court, while dissolving the marriage on the basis of Khula, directed the "respondent" to return the dower. As per column No.17 of Nikahnama, dower was in the shape of 4-tola gold ornaments, which is even not in dispute. Learned counsel for the "respondent" though submitted that a suit for recovery was instituted by the petitioner to this effect, which was dismissed but from the perusal of record it reveals that suit for recovery was related to some other gold ornaments, having no nexus with the gold ornaments subject matter of the present controversy.

9.    The term "decree" is nowhere defined in the Family Courts Act, 1964. So for this purpose, recourse can be made to section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), which defines the decree as under:-

  "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint the determination of any question within section 144 and an order under rules 60, 98, 99, 101 or 103 of Order XXI but shall not include ---

   (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order; or

(b) any order of dismissal for default.

After having a glimpse of the definition of decree, no doubt left that a decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint the determination of any question within section 144 and an order under Rules 60, 98, 99, 101 or 103 of Order XXI but shall not include any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or any order of dismissal for default. Suit for dissolution of marriage was decreed in terms of section 10 (4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The decision was compound, which on the one hand dissolved the marriage interse parties and on the other dissolution was made subject to return of dower.10.  Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 provides the manner of enforcement of decrees, which reads as under: -

   13. Enforcement of decrees.- (1) The Family Court shall pass a decree in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and shall enter its particulars in the prescribed register.

    (2) If any money is paid or any property is delivered in the presence of the Family Court, in satisfaction of the decree, it shall enter the fact of payment [or] the delivery of property, as the case may be, in the aforesaid register.

   (3) Where a decree relates to the payment of money and the decretal amount is not paid within time specified by the Court [not exceeding thirty days], the same shall, if the Court so directs be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.

  (4) The decree shall be executed by the Court, passing it or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may, by special or general order, direct. 

   (5) A Family Court may, if it so deems fit, direct that any money to be paid under a decree passed by it be paid in such installments as it deems fit.

11.  The manner and form of decree is provided in the West Pakistan Family Court Rules, 1965. Rules 16 and 17, for the said purpose, are more relevant, which are reproduced below:-

  16. In every suit, on passing the judgment, a decree shall be drawn up in Form I and shall be signed by the presiding Judge. The decree shall bear the seal of the Court.

 17. The Court shall maintain a register of decrees and orders in the form prescribed for decrees and orders under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

12.  The above discussion thus leads to irresistible conclusion that the order dated 8th December, 2010 resulting into dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula subject to return of dower, for all intent and purposes, was a decree under section 13 of the "Act, 1964" and was executable.

13.  The crux of above discussion is that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in law while allowing the revision petition. Resultantly, this petition is allowed. Impugned judgment dated 22nd September, 2016 is set aside being illegal and unlawful.

Checque of security

         سیکیورٹی چیک کا قانونی مقام ⚖️ ضمانتی چیک پر دفعہ 489-F کا اطلاق نہیں ہوتا — سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کا اہم فیصلہ (2024 SCMR 1567) سپ...