ABADI DEH ACT, 1995

 

 Abadi Deh:-

       Definition

 site of the village where predominantly people live, means a residential area of the village. 

Also see:-https://legaltimespk.blogspot.com/2021/10/shamlat-deh.html

    THE PUNJAB CONFERMENT OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS ON NON-PROPRIETORS IN ABADI DEH ACT, 1995

              (Pb. Act I of 1995) 

C O N T E N T S 

SECTIONS

1. Short title, extent and commencement. 

2. Definitions. 

3. Conferment of Proprietary rights in land on non-proprietors. 

4. Resolution of disputes. 

5. Appeal. 

6. Removal of difficulties. 

7. Rules. 

8. Bar of jurisdiction. 

9. Repeal.

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         THE PUNJAB CONFERMENT OF  PROPRIETARY RIGHTS ON.    NON-PROPRIETORS IN ABADI DEH ACT, 1995

              (Pb. Act I of 1995) 

                                      [l3 February 1995] 

An Act to provide for the conferment of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in the abadi deh Whereas it is expedient to confer proprietary rights on non-proprietors in the abadi deh in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah; 

 It is hereby enacted as follows:- 

 1. Short title, extent and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called the Punjab Conferment of Proprietary Rights on Non-proprietors in Abadi Deh Act, 1995. 

 (2) It extends to the whole of the Punjab. 

 (3) It shall come into force at once. 

 2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or 

context— 

 (1) “abadi deh” means and includes an area which is recorded as abadi deh in the record of rights prepared under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967(XVII of 1967) but does 

not include an urban area; 

 (2) “Collector” means a Collector of the district and includes.

2[a Deputy District Officer (Revenue)] or any officer specially empowered by the Government to perform the functions of a Collector under this Act; 

3[(3) “Executive District Officer (Revenue)” means the Officer Incharge of Group of District Officers as specified in Part-C of First Schedule of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 under the head“Revenue”]; 

 (4) 4[* * * * * * * * * * * *] 

 (5) “house” means building or structure used for residential purposes and includes 

a court-yard; 

 (6) “land” means and includes an area under a house in the abadi deh, but does not include any area reserved for a street, a lane, a playground, a school, a mosque or other place of worship, a graveyard, a drinking well or a pond meant for the village community; 

 (7) “non-proprietor” means an inhabitant of a village who ordinarily resides in the abadi deh of that village and who under any law or custom or usage having the force of law, in force immediately before thecommencement of this Act, is not a co-sharer in the abadi deh in which his house is situated; and 

 (8) “Urban area” means urban area as defined in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (VI of 1979). 

 3. Conferment of Proprietary rights in land on non-proprietors.—Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force or in 

any agreement, instrument, custom or usage or in any decree or order of any court or other authority, all rights, title and interest whatever, in the land which is situated within the abadi deh and which is under a house owned by a non-proprietor, shall on the commencement of this Act, vest in the non-proprietor under whose house it is situate, free of charge, and no compensation shall be claimed by or paid to any person or Government affected by the vesture of proprietary rights in a non-proprietor under this section.

4. Resolution of disputes.— Where any dispute arises from giving effect to the 

provisions of this Act, the Collector of the area in which the land is situated may, on the application of any aggrieved party made within a reasonable period, take cognizance of the dispute and decide the matter. 

 5. Appeal.— 5

[(1) An appeal against the order made by a Collector under this Act shall lie before the Executive District Officer (Revenue)]. 

 (2) The limitation for filing an appeal under this section shall be thirty days from the date of the impugned order excluding the period duly spent in obtaining certified copy of the impugned order and the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) shall apply to an appeal under this section. 

 (3) No order in appeal adversely affecting any person shall be passed without affording to the affected party an opportunity of being heard. 

 (4) The appeal filed under this section shall be disposed of within ninety days. 

 (5) An order passed in appeal under this section shall be final. 

 6. Removal of difficulties.— If any difficulty arises in giving effect to any provision of this Act, the Government may make such order, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as may appear to it to be necessary for purposes of removing the difficulty. 

 7. Rules.— The Government may make rules for the purposes of this Act. 

 8. Bar of jurisdiction.— No order passed or proceedings taken by the Collector or the 6[Commissioner] or the Government under this Act shall be called in question in any Civil Court. 

 9. Repeal.— The Punjab Conferment of Proprietary Rights on Non-Proprietors 

in Abadi Deh Ordinance, 1994 (XV of 1994) is hereby repealed. 

____________________ 

 

1 This Act was passed by the Punjab Assembly on 2nd February, 1995; assented to by the Governor of the Punjab on 12th February, 1995; and, was published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary), dated 13th February, 

1995, pages 1 to 3. 

2 Substituted for the words “an Assistant Commissioner or a Collector of a sub-division” by the Punjab Conferment 

of Proprietary Rights on Non-Proprietors in Abadi Deh (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001 (LVII of 2001) which was protected and continued under the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999 (Chief Executive’s Order 1 of 1999) as amended by the Provisional Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1999 (Chief Executive’s Order 9 of 1999) and Article 270AA of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as substituted by the Constitution 

(Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. 

3 Substituted ibid. 4 Omitted ibid. 

5 Substituted ibid. 

6 Now Executive District Officer (Revenue).

WAPDA Commercial Bills

                              Commercial  Building. 

                                                       Defined. 

                       2004 CLC 293 (LAH) 

Dr.SHAGUFTA HUSSAIN

 

 Versus

 

WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

October 20, 2003 —

           LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE

 

Honorable Justice Maulvi Anwarul Haq Nasir Saeed Sheikh , Khalid Zaman. 

1. According to this writ petition the petitioner No. l is the lease holder of the plot mentioned in para. l of the writ petition where she has constructed a residential house to accordance with the plan approved by the Local Cantonment Board. She is residing there with her- husband petitioner No.2 (now deceased) and other family members. The electric connection is available in the house. It is then stated that some rooms in the house are used as a study/library by late petitioner No. 2 who was a practising lawyer. Regular payment of bills has been alleged. Grievance made out is that on 6-3-1999 a bill was served showing arrears from February, 1998 to February, 1999 after Calculating the same on commercial basis. It has been stated that it is a residential house and being used as such and the mere user, of a portion of the house for study/library by the late husband of petitioner No. l cannot be made basis for charging the entire premises on commercial basis.

2. This writ petition was admitted to regular hearing on 7-12-1999. A notice was issued. 1 find that the respondents were served and their learned counsel filed his power of attorney on 21-3-2000. No written statement has been filed till date.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the premises in question is a residential house having been constructed as such and then being used as such and as such cannot be termed as a commercial premises for charging the same on the commercial tariff. He refers to the cases of v. Sasodharan v. Messrs Peter and Karunakar and others 1985 PSC 777, Dr. Devendra M. Surti v. The State of Gujarat Al R 1969 SC 63 and Gill Afzal Khan v. Muhammad Hanif Arif PLD 1979 Lah. 398. Learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand, contends that since admittedly portion of the house was being used by the late husband of the petitioner No. l as a study/library as a practising lawyer, the house is liable to be charged on the commercial rates.

4. I have given some thought to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. As stated by me above; a written statement has not been filed and it can be assumed that the facts stated in the writ petition stand admitted having not been denied. Now the position that emerges is that a house has been constructed which is being used for tile residence of the petitioner and her family members including her late husband; the petitioner No.2. He had used two rooms in the house for his study/library. Now it is true that the judgments cited by the learned counsel are with reference to the definition Of a commercial premises/ establishment under the Kerala and Bombay Shops and Establishment Acts respectively (Indian Supreme Court) and under the 'Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (this Court). However, the learned counsel for .the respondents has not been able to point out any definition of a commercial err a not-commercial/domestic premises under the Electricity Act. 1910 or WAPDA Act. 1958. I deem it proper here to reproduce the following observation of the Supreme Court of India in the said case of v. Sasodharan in para. 9.of the judgment at page 779 of the report: -

`Whatever may be the popular conception, or misconception regarding the role of today's lawyers and the alleged narrowing of the gap between a profession on one hand and a trade or business on the other, it is trite that traditionally, lawyers do not carry on a trade or business nor do they render services to `customers .

5. The term "commercial" has been defined as follows in Black's aw Dictionary (Fifth Edition) at p.245:--

"Commercial/Kamarshal/ Relates to or is connected with trade and traffic or commerce in general: is occupied with business and commerce. Anderson v. Humble Oil and refining Co. 2261 Ga. 252, 174 S.E.2d 415, 416. Generic term for most all aspects of buying and selling."

While tile term 'profession' has been so defined in the said Dictionary at pp.1089 and 1090 as under:-

"Profession. A vocation or occupation requiring special, usually advanced, education and skill: e.g. law or medical professions. Also refers to whole body of such profession.

The labour and skill involved in a profession is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.

The term originally contemplated only theology, law, and medicine, but as application of science and learning are extended to other departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name which implies professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished from mere skill."

6. Having thus examined the file I do conclude that a building which is primarily a residential house occupied by the petitioner and her family members including her late husband, the petitioner No.2, would not be converted into a commercial building because of use of a few rooms therein by the late husband of the petitions as his library/study or for that matter even his office for the reason that the lawyers do not carry on a trade or business. The writ petition accordingly is allowed and the impugned demand of the respondents is declared to be illegal and void. No orders as to costs.

S.A.K./S-783/L Petition allowed.

Superdari..

              Superdari 

under CNSA and registration of vehicle by the Motor Vehicle Authority when the vehicle is on superdari.

Crl.P.74-L/2018

Amjad Ali Khan v. The State,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN

(Appellate Jurisdiction)

Present:

Mr. Justice Manzoor Ahmad Malik

Mr. Justice Sardar Tariq Masood

Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah

Criminal Petition No.74-L of 2018

(on appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 30.10.2017, passed in Crl.A No.146/2016 & WP No.33366/2016)

Amjad Ali Khan            ...….Petitioner

Versus

The State, etc              …….Respondents

For the petitioner: Sardar Khurram Latif Khan Khosa, ASC.

For the State: Rana Abdul Majeed, Addl.P.G.

Mr. Wajeeh Ullah Kundi, Secy Excise Pb.

Mr. Suhail Shahzad, DG Excise, Pb.

Mian Latif ETO, Mianwali.

Mr. Bilal Azam, Director Excise ICT.

Mr. Sharif Gul, ETO, ICT.

Date of Hearing: 13.03.2020

ORDER

 Syed  Mansoor  Ali  Shah,  J.  Upon  a  spy-information,  the Police  conducted  a  raid  by  intercepting  a  vehicle,  i.e.,  Toyota Corolla  bearing  registration  No.  UH  608  (the  “Vehicle”)  and apprehended  its  two  passengers.  The  Police  allegedly  recovered narcotics  and  weapons  from  the  Vehicle,  as  well  as,  from  the passengers.  In  this  background  a  criminal  case  (FIR  no.  397)  was registered  against  the  two  passengers  at  Police  Station Mustafabad,  District  Lahore  on  20.08.2015  under  the  provisions  of the  Control  of  Narcotics  Substances  Act,  1997  (the  “CNSA”)  and Arms  Ordinance,  1965.  The  Police  also  seized  the  Vehicle  on the  same  day.  According  to  the  Report  submitted  before  this  Court by  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Lahore  dated  24.11.2018,  the trial  of  the  case  is  pending  adjudication  and  the  Additional Prosecutor General has not stated otherwise. 

2.     Brief  facts,  pertaining  to  the  instant  matter,  are  that  during trial,  the  petitioner,  claiming  himself  to  be  the  “owner”  of  the Vehicle  and  not  being  an  accused  in  the  case,  submitted  an application  before  the  trial  court  on  20.11.2015  for  release  of  the Vehicle  to  him  on  superdari.  The  petitioner  asserted  in  the application  that  he  was  the  owner  of  the  Vehicle  and  if  the  Vehicle was  not  handed  over  to  him  he  would  suffer  irreparable  loss; besides,  there  was  a  probability  that  the  Vehicle  may  suffer damage  in the possession of the Police. 

 3. The  trial  court  allowed  the  application  for  superdari  vide order dated 18.12.2015  with the direction  to  hand  over the custody of  the  Vehicle  to  the  petitioner.  The  State  challenged  the  order  in appeal  before  the  High  Court.  As  the  Vehicle  had  not  been released,  the  petitioner  also  filed  a  writ  petition  praying  that  the Police  be  directed  to  hand  over  the  Vehicle  to  him  in  compliance with  the  order  of  the  trial  court.  The  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal of  the  State  and  dismissed  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  petitioner vide  impugned  consolidated  Order  dated  30.10.2017,  on  the ground  that  the  petitioner  could  not  establish  his  ownership  of  the Vehicle  on  the  basis  of  an  open  transfer  letter.  Learned  counsel  for the  petitioner  has  pointed  out,  that  the  Vehicle  was  subsequently registered  in  the  name  of  the  petitioner  by  the  relevant  Authority on  21.01.2016.  Admittedly,  the  registration  of  the  Vehicle  in  favour of  the  petitioner  has  been  made  after  the  commission  of  the offence;  the  seizure  of  the  Vehicle  by  the  Police;  and  the registration of the criminal case. 

4. We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  gone through  the  record  of  the  case,  considered  the  submissions  of  the officials  of  the  Motor  Registration  Authority  (“Authority”)  and examined the relevant law. 

  5. This  case  brings  up  for  determination  two  distinct  yet interconnected  legal  issues.  First,  whether  a  vehicle  involved  in  the commission  of  an  offence  under  CNSA,  after  being  seized  by  the Police  and  put  up  before  the  court  as  case  property,  can  be temporarily  released  on  superdari  ?  And  second,  whether  a  vehicle that  has  been  seized  and  is  a  case  property  in  a  criminal  case under  the  Act  can  be  transferred  and  registered  in  the  name  of  a third  party  by  the  Authority  under  the  Motor  Vehicles  Ordinance, 1965  (the  “MVO”)  till  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  and  the  final disposal or confiscation  of the vehicle  by the court?   

A.  Release  of  Vehicle  (Case  Property)  on  Superdari  under CNSA 

6. Under the  scheme of  general criminal law,  a vehicle  seized  by the  Police  and  having  become  case  property,  can  be  released  on custody  (superdari),  during  the  trial,  under  sections  516-A  or  an order  be  made  for  its  disposal  to  the  person  entitled  to  its possession  by  the  Magistrate  under  section  523  of  the  Cr.P.C. Things  are,  however,  different  under  the  CNSA  which  does  not envisage  release  of  a  conveyance  (vehicle,  etc.)  during  the  trial, except  as  provided  in  the  proviso  to  section  32(2)  and  74  of  CNSA. Examining  the  scheme  of  the  Act,  we  note  that  section  32  deals with  Articles connected  with narcotics  in the following manner:-   

32.  Articles  connected  with  narcotics.---

(1)  Whenever  any offence  has  been  committed  which  is  punishable  under  this  Act, the  narcotic  drug,  psychotropic  substance  or  controlled substance,  materials,  apparatus  and  utensils  in  respect  of  which, or  by  means  of  which,  such  offence  has  been  committed  shall  be liable  to  confiscation.   

(2)  Any  narcotic  drug,  psychotropic  substance  or  controlled substance  lawfully  imported,  transported,  manufactured, possessed,  or  sold  alongwith,  or  in  addition  to,  any  narcotic  drug, psychotropic  substance  or  controlled  substance  which  is  liable  to confiscation  under  sub-section  (1)  and  the  receptacles  or packages,  and  the  vehicles,  vessels  and  other  conveyances  used in  carrying  such  drugs  and  substances  shall  likewise  be  liable  to confiscation:   

   Provided  that  no  vehicle,  vessel  or  other  conveyance  shall  be liable  to  confiscation  unless  it  is  proved  that  the  owner  thereof knew  that  the  offence  was  being,  or  was  to  be,  committed. 

7.   The  word  “narcotics”  in  the  title  of  the  section  refers  to narcotic  drugs,  psychotropic  substance  or  controlled  substance  in respect  of  which  an  offence  has  been  committed  under  the  CNSA (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “narcotics”).  Sub-section  (1)  of  section  32 provides  that  any  narcotics  or  materials,  apparatus  and  utensils  in respect  of  which  or  by  means  of  which  an  offence  punishable under  CNSA  has  been  committed  shall  be  liable  to  confiscation.  It is  pointed  out  that  section  32(1)  does  not  refer  to  any  conveyance including  a  vehicle  used  in  the  commission  of  the  offence.  Subsection  2  of  section  32  deals  with  articles,  which  are  connected with  narcotics;  These  articles  are  (i)  narcotic  drug,  psychotropic substance  or  controlled  substance  lawfully  imported,  transported, manufactured,  possessed  or  sold  (for  convenience  referred  to  as  “ lawful  drugs  and  substances”  as  compared  to  “narcotics” mentioned  above)  alongwith  or  in  addition  to,  any  narcotics  and articles  like  of  (ii)  receptacles  or  packages,  and  the  vehicles,  vessels and  other  conveyances  used  in  carrying  such  drugs  and substances.    Both  the  set  of  articles  mentioned  in  (i)  &  (ii)  above are  liable  to  confiscation.  Therefore,  vehicles,  vessels  and  other conveyances  are  liable  to  confiscation  if  they  are  used  in  carrying both  narcotics or narcotics alongwith lawful drugs and substances.  

 8. We  wish  to  point  out  that  at  first  blush,  reading  of  section 32(2)  does  create  an  impression  that  the  vehicles,  vessels  and other  conveyances  liable  to  confiscation  are  only  those  which  are used  in  carrying  joint  category  of  narcotics  and  lawful  drugs  and substance.  However,  a  more  holistic  reading  of  the  provision  shows that  it  would  be  absurd  to  imagine  that  only  vehicles,  vessels  and other  conveyances  carrying  joint  category  of  narcotics  and  lawful drugs  and  substances  are  liable  to  confiscation,  while  vehicles, vessels  and  other  conveyances  carrying  narcotics  alone  are  not liable  to  confiscation.  Therefore,  the  second  set  of  articles connected  with  narcotics  i.e.,  vehicles,  vessels  and  other conveyances  are  liable  to  confiscation  irrespective  whether  that  are used  in  carrying  narcotics  alone  or  joint  category  of  narcotics  and lawful drugs and substance.      

9.  The proviso to section 32 excludes certain vehicles, vessels and other conveyances from being liable to confiscation. According to the proviso unless it is proved that the owner of the vehicles, vessels and other conveyances knew that the offence was being or was to be committed, the vehicles, vessels and other conveyances are not liable to confiscation.  

10.  This view is further strengthened by the proviso to section 74 of CNSA, which provides: 

74. Application of other laws. If an offence punishable under this Act, is also an offence in any other law for the time being in force, nothing in that law shall prevent the offender from being punished under this Act:  

Provided that nothing contained in Section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), or any other provision of the said Code or any other law for time being in force, the custody of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances, any material utensils used for production or manufacture of such drugs or substances or any conveyance used in import, export, transport or transshipment thereof or for commission of an offence under this Act, shall not be given on custody to the accused or any of his associate or relative or any private individual till the conclusion of the case except as provided in the second proviso to subsection (2) of section 33. 

    Under the proviso to section 74 of CNSA, the provisions of Cr.P.C to the extent of custody and disposal of a conveyance under general law are not applicable under CNSA. A vehicle used in the commission of an offence under CNSA cannot be released or given on custody (superdari) to the accused or any of his associate or relative or any private individual till the conclusion of the case. The terms “associate” and “relative” have been defined in clauses (b) and (z-b) of section 2 of CNSA, and the expression “any private individual” used in the proviso to section 74 has been explained by this Court in the case of Allah Ditta1 to be an individual who has some nexus with the offender or the offence.     

11.  Joint reading of sections 32 and 74 of CNSA show that an applicant can seek release of a vehicle on superdari, which has been seized under CNSA and is a case property in a criminal case; if the applicant can show that he is the lawful owner of the vehicle; that he is neither the accused nor an associate or a relative of the accused or an individual having any nexus with the accused. While the prosecution has to show that the applicant knew that the offence was being or was to be committed. See Allah Ditta2. Under section 33 if the vehicle is finally held not liable to confiscation it can be released to its owner. As a corollary, where the court can pass a final order, it can also pass an interim order. See Abdul Salam3. Therefore, a vehicle can also be released as an interim measure or temporarily on superdari under CNSA after the court is prime facie satisfied regarding the ownership of the applicant and the absence of the association of the owner with the accused and the commission of the offence. The applicant while asserting his ownership of the vehicle must specify in his application for superdari how he was deprived of the vehicle, how and when he found out that his vehicle was missing, and the legal proceedings initiated by him thereafter, if any. This becomes important in the light of section 109 of MVO which attracts criminal liability if one drives a vehicle without the consent of the owner. On the other hand, in order to oppose the release of vehicle on superdari, the prosecution has to prima facie show from the record that the owner knew that the offence was being or was to be, committed. It is underlined that it is during the trial that the prosecution has to prove that the owner knew that the offence was being or was to be, committed.  

12.  Coming to the facts of the present case, the first and the foremost condition is that the petitioner must be the “owner” of the vehicle. “Owner” is defined in section 2(24) of MVO to mean a person in whose name the motor vehicle is registered and includes the transferee. Transferee must be duly registered under MVO. In the present case, the petitioner   moved an application for seeking superdari of the Vehicle on 20.11.2015, described himself as the owner of the Vehicle, but at the time, he only had an open transfer letter. An open transfer letter is not a valid document of title4 and it does not transfer ownership of a vehicle in terms of MVO Subsequently, the Vehicle was duly registered in the name of the petitioner on 21.01.2016. This was too late as at the time of alleged commission of the offence, the seizure of the Vehicle and the registration of the criminal case on 20.08.2015 the petitioner was not the owner of the Vehicle. An applicant must be the owner of the vehicle prior to the commission of the offence. The registration certificate of the Vehicle shows that the original owner of the Vehicle was Muslim Khan, who sold the Vehicle to Asif Kamal and then finally the Vehicle was transferred in the name of the petitioner on 21.01.2016. Asif Kamal, was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the offence, but did not approach the court to seek release of the Vehicle. On 20.08.2015, when the petitioner made application for superdari of the Vehicle, he was not the owner of the Vehicle and, therefore, does not pass the requirement laid down in proviso to section 32 of CNSA.

13. Further, the petitioner did not assert a word, in the application, to show that he was not an associate or relative of the accused or an individual having any nexus with the accused or the offence. His failure to explain how the Vehicle, whose ownership he claims, had gone into the possession and use of the accused was fatal to his prayer for superdari of the same. As the petitioner has failed to establish his ownership of the Vehicle, we see no reason to burden the prosecution to show if the petitioner was aware of the commission of the offence. The application made for release of the Vehicle by the petitioner was, therefore, not maintainable, and was wrongly allowed by the trial court.

B.  Transfer of ownership of a seized vehicle and its registration under the Ordinance 

14. The Vehicle was registered in the name of the petitioner by the Motor Registration Authority under MVO when the Vehicle had already  been  seized  by  the  Police  and  had  become  case  property  in a criminal case, hence becoming liable to confiscation  under  CNSA. As  a  result  the  disposal  of  the  vehicle  comes  under  the  control  of the  court  and  the  owner  stands  cautioned  not  to  deal  or  transact with  the  title  of  the  vehicle  till  the  conclusion  of  the  trial.  Infact there  is  a  freeze  on  the  legal  title  of  the  owner  of  the  vehicle  till  the conclusion  of  the  trial.    The  rationale  behind  this  being  that  any transfer  or  change  in  the  title  of  the  vehicle  (case  property)  would undermine  the  safe  administration  of  criminal  justice  system;  as any  such  transfer  (registration  of  the  vehicle  in  the  name  of  a  third party)  would  amount  to  interference  in  the  powers  of  the  criminal court  and in eroding  the  sanctity and  security  of the  evidence  in an ongoing  criminal  trial.  Therefore,  transfer  of  ownership  of  the Vehicle  by  the  Motor  Registration  Authority  on  21.01.2016  was  not permissible and is, therefore,  without lawful authority.   

15.  Section  23  of  MVO  provides  that  no  person  shall  drive  a vehicle  or  no  owner  shall  permit  the  vehicle  to  be  driven  in  any place  unless  the  vehicle  is  registered  in  accordance  with  provisions of  MVO.    Section  27  requires  physical  production  of  the  vehicle before  the  Authority  or  any  authority  as  the  Government  may appoint  for  this  purpose,  in  order  that  the  Authority  is  satisfied that  the  particulars  contained  in  the  application  are  true  and  the vehicle  complies  with  the  requirements  of  Chapter  VI  and  of  the Rules  thereunder.  Physical  verification  of  the  vehicle  prior  to registration  has  many  advantages.  First,  it  helps  the  registering authority  verify  that  the  vehicle  being  registered  is  the  same  as mentioned  in  the  application  form  (Form  F),  e.g.  class  of  vehicle, type  of  body,  maker’s  name,  year  of  manufacture,  etc.  Second,  it confirms  that  the  vehicle  physically  exists  at  the  time  of registration  and  thirdly,  the  owner  is  in  lawful  possession  of  the vehicle  (moveable  property).  Section  32  provides  for  transfer  of ownership  in  favour  of  a  subsequent  transferee.  We  see  no  reason why  the  process  of  registration  of  a  vehicle  provided  under  section 27  be  any  different  for  the  vehicle  being  registered  subsequently  in the  name  of  a  new  transferee  and  for  any  further  transfers.  The importance  of  physical  verification  remains  equally  important  in subsequent  transfers,  as  has  come  to  surface  in  the  instant  case, where  a  vehicle  allegedly  involved  in  the  commission  of  a  crime, which  had  been  seized  by  the  police  and  was  a  case  property  in  a criminal  case,  yet  it  was  registered  in  the  name  of  the  petitioner  on the  basis  of  wrongful  assumption  that  the  transferor  holds  an absolute  legal  title  of  the  Vehicle  and  is  in  lawful  possession  of  the same.    The  application  for  registration  (Form  F)  or  the  application for  transfer  of  ownership,  rests  upon  a  fundamental  assumption that  the  vehicle  is  in  lawful  ownership  and  possession  of  the  owner of  the  vehicle.  In  order  to  effectively  regulate  the  vehicles  under MVO,  physical  verification  of  the  vehicle  at  the  time  of  registration and  its  subsequent  registration  is  critical  and  is  also  in  the  public interest  besides  advancing  the  purposes  of  MVO.   Physical verification  of  the  vehicle  also  helps  actualize  sections  34  and  35  of MVO  dealing  with  suspension  and  cancellation  of  registration  of the  vehicle.  We,  therefore,  hold  that  the  requirement  of  section  27 regarding  physical  verification  of  the  vehicle  prior  to  registration  is an  essential  requirement  and  is  fully  applicable  to  subsequent registrations  of  vehicles  under  section  32  of  MVO.  We,  therefore, refer  the  matter  relating  to  the  registration  of  the  Vehicle  in  favour of the  petitioner  dated  21.01.2016  to  the  concerned  Motor Registration Authority  for necessary  action  under the  law. 

 Direction  to  the  Government,  Motor  Registration  Authority and the Police.   

16.  We  deem  it  appropriate  to  direct  the  Provincial  Government, and  Chief  Commissioner,  ICT  to  consider  amendment(s)  in  MVO and  the  Rules  thereunder  to  prevent  registration  of  vehicles involved  in  the  commission  of  crime  as  discussed  above.  In addition,  the  Provincial  Governments  and  ICT  may  consider  that the  Motor  Registration  Authority  and  the  Police  develop  an  online verification  system  to  identify  vehicles  involved  in  the  commission of  crime.  The  transferor/transferee  at  the  time  of  registration  of  the vehicle  may  be  required  to  obtain  a  No  Objection  Certificate  from the  Police  or  to  submit  an  Affidavit  to  the  effect  that  the  vehicle  is not  involved in any criminal case.     

 17.  For  what  has  been  discussed  above  we  find  that  the  order  of the  trial  court  whereby  the  petitioner  had  been  allowed  superdari of  the  Vehicle  was  not  sustainable  under  the  law  and  was, therefore,  rightly  set  aside  by  the  High  Court.  We  uphold  the impugned  order,  decline  leave  and  dismiss  this  petition,  with  the above  direction  to  the  Provincial  Governments  and  ICT,  Motor Registration  Authority  and  the  Police.  The  Deputy  Registrar  of  this Court  at  the  Lahore  Branch  Registry  shall  send  copy  of  this  order to  the  Secretaries,  Excise  &  Taxation  Department  of  all  the Provincial  Governments  and  Director,  Excise  &  Taxation Department,  ICT,  as  well  as,  Inspectors  General  Police  of  the respective  Governments,  for  information  and  appropriate  action  at their  end.  These  are  the  reasons  for  our  short  order  dated 13.03.2020.  

           Lahore, 13th  March, 2020.

     Approved for reporting M.Farhan J

  ---------------------------------------------------                                    1  Allah Ditta v. The State,

                      2010 SCMR 1181

3. Abdul Salam v. The State, 2003 SCMR 246 

 4.See Sameen Khan v. The State, 2016 P.Cr.L.J. (Notes) 120; Razik Hussain v. Additional District ænd Sessions Judge-V and 2 others, 2015 YLR 2271; Ghulam Yasin v. The State and 3 others, 2014 MLD 90

Cognizance

            Cognizance .    

                  s190 to 199 CrPc. 

Cognizance has not been defined in the criminal procedure code. 

* Literally it means to become aware of.

* Legal Parlance.

* to take judicial notice of an offence snd to probe  whether an offence has been committed or not, and if committed then whether proceed according to provisions of lex lata on the subject.It is , first time judicial  Notice by the Magistrate of commission of an offence and Judicial  check on the police ipsi dixit. 

S. 190 Crpc. Basic Rules for Cognizance.

Empowered to take Cognizance .

* All the Magistrates of the first. 

* Any other Magistrate specially empowered by the Provincial Government .

* Recommended  by  High Court .

 *· upon receiving a complaint. (S. 200 Crpc) 

 *· upon a police report.(S.173 Crpc) 

 *· upon information received from any person other than a police officer, 

 * Upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 

Prerequisites. 

Cognizance will be  taken only when there is a prime facie case to proceed further. 

Procedure after Cognizance. 

* He may try himself or send to the Court of Sessions for trial.

Exceptions. 

   1.                  S.194......High Court                          

 (1) The High Court may take cognizance of any offence  as provided in any Letters Patent or 

Order by which a High Court is constituted or continued, or any other provision of this Code. 

2. S. 195 .   Contempt of Lawful authority                        of public servants

   (1) No Court shall take cognizance: -- 

(a) Any offence punishable u/Ss. 172 to 188 PPC. 

        * Except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or 

       * of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate; 

(b) Any offence punishable under:-

           Ss.193, 194, 195,196. 199. 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228.

            * when such offence is committed in, 

     * or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court,

 except, on the complaint in writing of such Court or

           of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; or 

(c)  Of any offence u/Ss. 463,471,475, 476 PPC, when such offence is  committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. 

* The term "Court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court.

But does not include a Registrar or sub-Registrar under the Registration Act, 1908. 

* Upon complaint of appellate  Court. 

*Upon complaint by the principal Court having original civil jurisdiction. 

*Upon complaint by the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction, Where appeals lie to more than one Court. 

* where appeals tie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed 

to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or 

proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. 

*The provisions  with reference to the offences apply to the abetment, attempts and conspiracies of such offences. 

Withdrawal of the Complaint .

  *  The authority to the Public servant may order the withdrawal of the complaint and it shall forward a copy of such order to the Court, and upon receipt thereof by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint.  

S..196.Chapter VI or IX-AIX-A

* No Court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI or IX-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (except Section 127), or

* Punishable u/Ss 108-A,153-A, 294-A, 295-A,505 PPC, 

unless upon complaint made by order of or under authority from, the Federal Government or the Provincial Government concerned, 

* Some officer empowered in this behalf by either of the two Governments. 

4..  196-A. Criminal conspiracy: 

        No Court shall take cognizance of :-

       * The offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, 

  * Object of the conspiracy is to commit either an illegal act other than an offence, or 

  * A legal act by illegal means, or 

  * An offence to which the provisions of Section 196 apply, 

Except upon complaint is made by:-

* the Federal Government or

* the Provincial Government concerned or 

*Some officer empowered in this behalf by either of the two Governments, or 

* Object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, 

* a cognizable offence ,

* not punishable with death,

* imprisonment for life or

* rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, 

unless. 

*The Provincial Government or 

* District Prosecutor empowered  by the Provincial Government, has, by order in writing, consented to the initiation of the proceedings: 

* criminal conspiracy is under sub-section (4) of Section 195 .

No such consent shall be necessary196-B. 

Preliminary inquiry by Police Officer:-

* Any offence under the provisions of Section 196 or Section 196-A PPC. 

* officer in-charge of the investigation in the district] may,order a preliminary investigation. 

*No  police-officer not being below the rank of inspector shall have the powers to investigate u/S.155, sub-section (3)

5-  S.197. CrPc .President, etc .

 No Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous 

sanction by:-

*The Federation of the President or

* The Governor of that Province. 

* Against a Judge u/S.19 of the Pakistan Penal Code, or 

* Any Magistrate, or 

*Any public servant , removable  with the sanction of the Federal Government or

*  Provincial Government, 

*Accused of any offence  committed  acting in the discharge of his Official duty,

 Power of President or Governor as to prosecution:

 The President or Governor, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held. 

6. S.198. Ch:19,20,21 PPC

   No Court shall take cognizance of an offences under:-

         * CHAPTER XIX, CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACTS OF SERVICE

         * CHAPTER XXI, OF DEFAMATION. 

         * CHAPTER XX,OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE(Sections 493 to 496)

Except 

            * Upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence: 

             *Some other person may make a complaint. 

                     With permission of Court. 

              *If aggrieved :-

                      + is a woman ,ought not to be compelled to appear in public. 

                       + As per customs and mariners (sailor)of the country. 

                        + is under the age of eighteen years. 

                        + is an idiot or lunatic. 

                        + is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint. 

Armed forces Personnel. 

* Certified by the commanding Officer to enable to make a complaint  through other person. 

* Husband must be aggrieved aggrieved by an offence u/S.494 PPC. 

* With the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf u/s.198-A. PPC. 

  Case of defamation against public servants

7---S.198-A

    Defamation against public servants 

in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions offence falling under Chapter XXI of the PPC is committed against :-

+the President, 

+the Prime Minister, +

+ a Federal Minister, 

+Minister of State, 

+Governor, +

Chief Minister or 

+Provincial Minister or

+ any public servant of the Federation or Province. 

Cognizance:-

+ A Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence, 

  + Upon a complaint in writing -made by the Public Prosecutor. 

  + Without the accused being committed to it for trial, 

No Complaint by the Prosecutor unless previous sanction:-

+ Any secretary to the Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned in cade of:-

+the President, 

+the Prime Minister, +

+ a Federal Minister, 

+Minister of State, 

+Governor, +

+Chief Minister, 

+Provincial Minister. 

 In the case of any public servant 

                 The Government concerned. 

√  Contents of Complaint. 

+ The facts which constitute the offence alleged, 

+The nature of such offence. 

+ Particulars as are reasonably sufficient to give notice to accused of the offence. 

Limitation. 

√ No Court of Session shall take cognizance of an offence unless 

the -complaint is made within six months from the date of commission of the offence. 

√ Shall follow the procedure prescribed for the trial by Magistrates instituted otherwise than on a police report. 

8.........S.199.   

Adultery or enticing a married woman ; 

•√ No Court shall take cognizance of an offence u/S 497  498 PPC. 

         Except-- 

(a) upon a report in writing made by a police-officer on the complaint of the husband of the 

          woman.

Some Other Person if:- 

       +In absence of the husband, by the person taking care of the woman on his behalf with permission of the court. 

       + Husband is under the age of eighteen years, 

       + An idiot or lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint. 

      may, with the-leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf: 

* Husband is serving in any of the armed forces of Pakistan, under conditions which are certified by his Commanding Officer. 

Quashment Of FIR.

                                                      Quashment Of FIR.

 

              Welfare , safety and security of the state of the people is the only climax of Law.Safety of the  suppressed is the only goal of the legislation. But some people  take the undue advantage of the laws formulated to safeguard them and use them to incriminate the innocent people and implicate them with false charges.

 FIR or complaints having false and friviolous facts simply means making false allegations with malicious intention by lodging FIR or complaints based on falsifying the facts and fabricating the circumstances in order to persecute the other person.

 Sections 561-A, 249-A, And 265-K, Cr.P.C.

Inherent powers of High Court are very wide and undefinable. High Court can make all such orders which may do real and substantial justice. (SC) 1969 P.Cr.LJ Shahkot Bus Service.

 

 Lodging of FIR:

1-Lodging of First  before police under section 154 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 .

2-Complaint made before superintendent of police under section 154(3) CrPC.

3-Cognizance of offence by magistrate under section 190 CrPC.

4-Private complaint made before Magistrate under section 200 crpc.

Grounds for Quashing FIR,

1-The allegations Levelled in the first information report does not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2-The FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable.

3-The first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence.

4-The evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

5-An express legal bar exists in the code or the concerned Act- providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

6-Criminal proceeding is disclosing mala  fide, maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive,

7-The exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing is based purely on the subjective assessment of the judge. He has to strike a balance between the powers of the courts CrPC and the facts of the case.

(8)No offense is made out from contents of FIR,

(9) Malafides of complainant is patent on the face of the record, 

(10) It converts a pure civil liability into criminal liability. 

Quashment principles.

1= Offence is not made out by examining a complaint without  any extraneous material.

2-If the prosecution was launched for improper motives merely to harass the accused .

2-Its pendency would be an abuse of the process of the Court .

3-Other Facts  impel the Court to conclude that it would not be in the ends of justice to allow the prosecution to continue.1981 SCMR 315. Naseem Beg v. Muhammad Iqbal etc.

4-Quashment is voice of the Law when no other procedure for redress is available.

5-Power under Section 561-A is neither alternative nor additonal;

6-Inherent Power  is to be invoked only in the interest of justice for redress of grievance having no other procedure. The provision is not to be used to divert the ordinary course of criminal procedure. (SC) PLD 1976 SC 461. Khaja Fazal Karim.

7-Normally every case should be allowed to proceed according to law, otherwise it would tend to circumvent the process of law. 1996 SCMR 839, Sheikh Masood Saeed v. Amir Nawaz Khan.

8-Quashment of proceedings u/S. 561-A Cr.P.C. the Application is liable to be rejected when it is made before the facts and circumstances of the case are revealed during the trial.

9-Quashing of proceeding not maintainable where remedy under Section 435 or 439, Cr.P.C. is available. (SC) 1968 SCMR 62. Sher Khan. (SC) PLD 1967 SC 317, Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal.

10-U/S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. High Court is competent to quash proceedings even at the stage when challan has not yet reached Court and is under scrutiny with the prosecution branch. 1990 P.Cr.LJ 798. Falak Naz.

Quashment of FIR after submission of challan.

The High Court  has the power to quash an FIR even after filing of Charge Sheet by the prosecution. The parties can also reach a modus vivendi.

Quashing of FIR on the basis of Compromise

The FIR an be quashed on the basis of compromise at any stage by the High Court. The complainant and accused can enter into a compromise. Both the parties can file a joint petition

Quashing of FIR in Financial Disputes

 Quashing the FIR is the obvious recourse when the financial dispute is settled after the parties come to terms.

Remedies for the Accused.

1-Filling a complaint under section 182 PPC

2-A private complaint under section 200 CrPC.

3. A complaint against him under section 211 PPC, whereby the complainant who made false allegations and lodged fabricated FIR shall be punished with imprisonment .

4.May file Complaint before the Court for compensation under section 250 CrPC for accusation without reasonable cause the provisions of this section shall apply to summons and warrant cases also.

Alternative Remedies…….(2006 S.C.M.R. 276) 

 Where the charge was  framed or after the evidence had been recorded. There were also alternative remedies available  under the CrPC sec.265K and 249-A  before the concernedcourt.

          Misuse of the process of law 

               (PLD 2009 S.C. 102) 

 where the Supreme Court held that once an FIR was registered, the superior courts had a set precedent of refraining from direct interference with police investigations in criminal cases as this may be prejudicial to the accused and to the fairness of the proceedings, along with being outside the jurisdiction of the court. The only reasons permitting such an action would if be the FIR’s registration appeared to be a misuse of the process of law or without any legal justification.

Extraordinary Remedy.

(PLD 2006 S.C. 598)

The judge also noted that according to the Supreme Court in Muhammad Mansha. Vs. Station House Officer, P.S. City, Chiniot, etc.” (PLD 2006 S.C. 598) quashing an FIR by resorting to art.199 of the Constitution was an extraordinary remedy which could be invoked only in exceptional circumstances which had not been provided by the petitioner.