Sunday, February 28, 2021

Succession Certificate

         To Learn More....... Click here


               THE PUNJAB LETTERS 

                OF ADMINISTRATION 

    AND SUCCESSION CERTIFICATES                           ORDINANCE 2021

                           VIII of 2021)

CONTENTS

1.Short title, extent and commencement

2.Definitions

3.Issuance of Letters of Administration or Succession Certificates

4.Establishment of Succession Facilitation Unit

5.Functions of Succession Facilitation Unit

6.Application for Letters of Administration or Succession certificates

7.Forms of Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates

8.Objection to Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates

9.Fee and costs

10.Bar of Jurisdiction

11.Penalty, offences and trial

12.Ordinance to override other laws

13.Power to make rules

Xxxxxxxxxx

1.THE PUNJAB LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION AND SUCCESSION 

   CERTIFICATES ORDINANCE 2021(VIII of 2021)

          [10 February 2021]

An Ordinance to provide for an efficacious and speedy mechanism for issuance of Letters of 

Administration and Succession Certificates.

It is expedient to provide for an efficacious and speedy mechanism for facilitating 

issuance of Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates, aimed at curtailing fraud and forgery.

Provincial Assembly of the Punjab is not in session and Governor of the Punjab is 

satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action. 

In exercise of the powers conferred under clause (1) of Article 128 of Constitution of

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Governor of the Punjab is pleased to make and 

promulgate the following Ordinance:

1.Short title, extent and commencement.- (1) This Ordinance may be cited as 

the Punjab Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Ordinance 2021.

(2)It extends to whole of the Punjab.

(3) This Ordinance or any part thereof shall come into force on such dates as the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint.

2.Definitions.- In this Ordinance:

(a)“Authority” means the National Database and Registration Authority 

established under section 3 of the National Database and Registration 

Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000);

(b)“factual controversy” includes an objection by legal heirs or by any claimant of legal heirship, any dispute which may arise in establishing the identity of legal heirs which is not resolvable by the Authority or any situation, matter or event requiring adjudication or recording of evidence 

or where at least one of the legal heirs is a minor;

(c)“Government” means Government of the Punjab;

(d)“legal heir” means a person who has entitlement to a share in the 

property of the deceased;

1This Ordinance was Promulgated by the Governor of the Punjab on 10 February 2021; and, was published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary), dated: 10 February 2021, pp. 6063-60(e)

“prescribed” means prescribed by the rules; and

(f)“rules” means the rules made under this Ordinance;

3.Issuance of Letters of Administration or Succession Certificates.-

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the 

Authority may issue Letters of Administration or Succession Certificates, as the case 

may be, to the legal heirs of a deceased in respect of immovable or movable 

property, in accordance with the Family Registration Certificate maintained by the Authority.

4.Establishment of Succession Facilitation Unit.- (1) The Authority shall establish a Succession Facilitation Unit for the purpose of receipt, processing and assessment of applications for grant of Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates.

(2)For the purpose of subsection (1), the Authority may notify any of its existing offices as Succession Facilitation Unit, at such place or places as it may deem appropriate.

(3)The Authority may, from time to time, appoint officers, staff, experts, consultants, advisers and other employees, on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit, for the purpose of carrying functions under this Ordinance.

5.Functions of Succession Facilitation Unit.-The Succession Facilitation Unit shall perform the following functions:

(a)receive applications for grant of Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates, as the case may be, from legal heirs of the deceased;

(b)process and assess the applications by way of a summary enquiry as prescribed, and in case of any factual controversy amongst the legal heirs decline to assess the applications for filing afresh before the appropriate forum in accordance with the provisions of the Succession 

Act, 1925 (XXXIX of 1925) or any other applicable law;

(c)maintain an online portal providing for updated record of the Letters of

Administration and Succession Certificates issued under this Ordinance; and

(d)discharge or perform such functions as are incidental, ancillary or 

necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance.

6.Application for Letters of Administration or Succession certificates.- 

(1) An application for grant of Letter of Administration or Succession Certificate, as the 

case may be, shall be made to the Authority by the legal heirs:

Provided that legal heirs may also authorize in the prescribed form, one 

amongst themselves, to act on behalf of all other legal heirs, for the purpose of filing 

an application under this Ordinance.

(2)An application may be filed in the notified office of the Authority within whose jurisdiction the deceased ordinarily resided at the time of his death, or within 

whose jurisdiction any property or asset of the deceased is located.

(3)The following documents shall be appended along with the application:

(a)death certificate of the deceased;

(b)list of the legal heirs and copies of their national identity cards;

(c)an authorization in the prescribed form by the legal heirs in favour of the applicant as provided in proviso to subsection

 (1); and

(d)details of immovable and movable property in respect of which the Letter of Administration or Succession Certificate is applied for.

(4)Upon receipt of the application, a notice to the general public shall be published on a web portal to be maintained by the Authority and in one English language and one Urdu language daily newspaper of wide circulation.

(5)Where no objection or claim is received within fourteen days of the publication of notice, the Authority shall, in any of its notified offices, obtain the biometric verification of the applicant and all the legal heirs:

Provided that where bio-metrics of a legal heir is not verified, the Authority may require the legal heir to appear in person before the Authority on a date fixed by the Authority:

Provided further that the Authority may resort to any other modern device with a view to satisfying itself as to the identity of any legal heir.Explanation: The bio-metric verification can be undertaken at any notified office within Pakistan or abroad.

(6)Upon satisfactory compliance of the codal formalities mentioned in this section, the applicant shall appear before the Authority on a date fixed by it, whereafter the Authority shall issue the Letter of Administration or Succession Certificate, as the case may be, in favour of all legal heirs of the deceased with details of their respective shares as provided in the personal  

law of such legal heirs.

(7)The Letters of Administration or Succession Certificates issued under 

this Ordinance shall have the same effect as if the same have been issued under the 

Succession Act, 1925 (XXXIX of 1925).

7.Forms of Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates.- Letters 

of Administration and Succession Certificates shall be issued, as nearly as 

circumstances admit, in the forms prescribed by the Authority.

8.Objection to Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates.—

Any person objecting to Letters of Administration or Succession Certificates, as the 

case may be, after the issuance of the Letters of Administration or Succession 

Certificates by the Authority, may seek remedies available under any other applicable law.

9.Fee and costs.- (1) The Authority may charge the prescribed fees or other sums for its services under this Ordinance including sums incurred on publication of public notice

.(2)The charges or sums received under subsection (1) shall be credited to the NADRA Fund established under section 24 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000).

10.Bar of Jurisdiction.- No court shall exercise jurisdiction till such time theAuthority declines to process application for issuance of the Letters of Administration or Succession Certificates by the legal heirs.

11.Penalty, offences and trial.- The provisions in relation to offences, penalties and trial mentioned in Chapter IX of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000) shall apply mutatis mutandis under this Ordinance.

12.Ordinance to override other laws.- The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.

13.Power to make rules.- The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Ordinance.

Xxxxxxxxxx

               Fee & Services

Initial Processing Fees:
If value of the asset/property is more than Rs. 100,000/- than fee payable is Rs. 20,000/-
If value of the asset/property is less than Rs. 100,000/- than fee payable is Rs. 10,000/-
Duplicate Certificate Fees:
Application fee for Duplicate certificate is Rs. 5000/-


Initial Processing Fees:

If value of the asset/property is more than Rs. 100,000/- than fee payable is Rs. 20,000/-

If value of the asset/property is less than Rs. 100,000/- than fee payable is Rs. 10,000/-

Duplicate Certificate Fees:

Application fee for Duplicate certificate is Rs. 5000/-

Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial law

 

Constitution of Pakistan                           1973. 

Inconsistency between  Federal and  Provincial  law


 

[143.  If  any  provision  of  an  Act  of  a  Provincial  Assembly  is  repugnant  to any  provision  of  an  Act  of  Majlis-e-Shoora  (Parliament)  which  Majlis-eShoora  (Parliament)  is  competent  to  enact,  then  the  Act  of  Majlis-eShoora  (Parliament),  whether  passed  before  or  after  the  Act  of  the Provincial  Assembly,  shall  prevail  and  the  Act  of  the  Provincial  Assembly shall,  to the  extent of  the repugnancy, be  void.]


2014  SCMR  535     


 143---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial law---Under provisions of Art. 143 of the Constitution, laws enacted by Parliament had been given over-riding and superimposing effect over laws enacted by a Provincial Assembly of any of the Provinces, and in case of any clash or repugnancy between the two, the laws enacted by the Parliament prevailed---On the touchstone of Art. 143 of the Constitution, an Act of Parliament had been placed on a higher pedestal and any Provincial law enacted by a Provincial Assembly shall give way to the Federal law enacted by Parliament, if the former was inconsistent or repugnant to the latter.


 2014  PLC  203     

143---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial law---Under provisions of Art. 143 of the Constitution, laws enacted by Parliament had been given over-riding and superimposing effect over laws enacted by a Provincial Assembly of any of the Provinces, and in case of any clash or repugnancy between the two, the laws enacted by the Parliament would prevail---On the touchstone of Art.143 of the Constitution, an Act of Parliament had been placed on a higher pedestal and any Provincial law enacted by a Provincial Assembly shall give way to the Federal law enacted by Parliament, if the former was inconsistent or repugnant to the latter.


PLD  2009  SUPREME-COURT  507   


Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.143---Act to override other laws---Held, on account of S.3, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1992 explicitly conferring overriding effect to its provisions, any provision in an earlier law repugnant thereto would be void and inoperative---On account of mandate of Art.143, Constitution, provisions of Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1992, would prevail upon any existing law being made by a Provincial Legislation.


PLD  2006  SUPREME-COURT  697     

Arts. 8 & 143---Inconsistency of laws---Constitution being a basic document is always treated to be higher than other statutes and whenever a document in the shape of -law given by the Parliament or other competent authority is in conflict with the Constitution or is inconsistent then to that extent the same is liable to be declared unconstitutional---Principles.


PLD  2005  SUPREME-COURT  1     

Preamble---Marriage Functions (Prohibition of Ostentatious Displays and Wasteful Expenses) Ordinance (II of 2000), Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 143, 184(3) and Concurrent Legislative List, Fourth Schedule, Item 5---Constitutional petition before Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Petitioner had challenged the vires of Marriage Functions (Prohibition of Ostentatious Displays and Wasteful Expenses) Ordinance, 2000 whereby restriction on wasteful expenses on the occasion of marriage had been imposed and the vires of Punjab Marriage Functions (Prohibition of Ostentations Displays and Wasteful Expenses) Act, 2003 limiting the number of invitees to 300 and placing restriction of one dish food only thereunder---


 1999  PLC(CS)  1222     

----Arts. 141, 142 & 143---Distribution of legislative, powers --- Conflict between the Federal Legislature and Provincial Legislature---Resolution by judiciary---In the event of any inconsistency between the Federal Law ar Provincial Law, the mandate of the Constitution, as contained in Art. 143 is to prevail---Principles---Doctrine of occupied field---Applicability.


 

1999  SCMR  1477     

 Arts. 141, 142 & 143 --- Distribution of legislative powers --- Conflict between the Federal Legislature and Provincial Legislature --- Resolution by judiciary --- In the event of any inconsistency between the Federal Law and Provincial Law, the mandate of the Constitution, as contained in Art. 143 is to prevail--Principles --- Doctrine of occupied field --- Applicability.


 1993  SCMR  941   

   ----Art.143---West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance (VII of 1960), Preamble--Cantonments Pure Food Act (XVI of 1966), Preamble---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Laws---Clear cut overlapping of jurisdiction of the functionaries under West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance, 1960 (Provincial Statute) and Cantonments Pure Food Act, 1966 (Federal Statute) was likely to result in divergent actions and conflicting orders and it was not possible to harmonize the provisions of the two enactments and remove the inconsistency---Two enactments, thus, could not co-exist---West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance, 1960 being a provincial statute, so far as Cantonment area was concerned, was to give way to the Cantonments Pure Food Act, 1966 which was a Federal Statute.


 1991  SCMR  552     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 185(3) & 143---Leave to appeal was granted to examine the questions that S.2 of the Act had purported to reopen the orders passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities which had attained finality under the Central Laws made for the rehabilitation and settlement of the refugees and the Schemes made there under and Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975 was ultra vires and hit by the provisions contained in Art.143 of the Constitution; that in so far as S.3 of the said Act enabled the contenders to move the relevant Authorities appointed there under, its provisions were repugnant to the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974 as the orders passed there under had attained finality by virtue of S.6, General Clauses Act, 1897 and could not be re-opened in this manner in contravention of the provisions contained in Art. 143, Constitution of Pakistan; that the said Act by permitting the adjudication upon private rights of the parties constituted as unauthorised encroachment upon the judicial field and therefore, suffered from Constitutional invalidity; that persons having acquired rights in the lands in dispute on the hypothesis that the widow was a full owner their entitlement stood clinched by efflux of time under the Limitation Act, 1908 which was a Central Statute and this could not have been undone by the said Act of 1975 and that the said Act also enabled the alienations in favour of bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration to be challenged in conflict with the provisions contained in S.41, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and other cognate matters forming the subject-matter of the; Central Statutes.


 1987  SCMR  1747     

---Arts. 185(3) & 143--Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act (XXV of 1975), Ss. 1, 3 & 4--Leave to appeal, grant of--Interpretation of constitutional provisions--Vires of provisions of Act (XXV of 1975)--Land settlement--Limited owner--Alienation of property--Effect of--Leave to appeal granted to examine questions of general importance pertaining to interpretation of constitutional provisions that (i) whether section 2 of the Act had purported to reopen the orders passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities which had attained finality under the Central laws made for the rehabilitation and settlement of the refugees and the schemes made there under and thus, the Punjab Act was ultra vires and hit by the provisions contained in Article 143 of the 1973 Constitution; (ii) that in so far as section 3 of the Act enables the contenders to move the relevant authorities appointed thereunder, its provisions were repugnant to the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal)


 2019  CLC  155     

Art. 143---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Laws---Effect---If any provision of an Act of Provincial Assembly was repugnant to any provision of an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) which it was competent to enact then the Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) whether passed before or after the Act of Provincial Assembly would prevail and the Act of Provincial Assembly would be void to the extent of the repugnancy.


PLD  2017 Lahore  489     

. 154, 153, 142, 143 & Fourth Sched. Part II---Cooperative/ participatory federalism---Council of Common Interest (CCI)---Constitutional role and importance of the CCI under Art.154 of the Constitution over matters falling in Part-II of the Federal Legislative List---Scope---Legislative subjects under Part-II of the Federal Legislative List required a coordinated and intergovernmental policy and the CCI was to formulate and regulate policies in relation to matters in Part-II of the Federal Legislative List and to exercise supervision and control over related institutions---CCI also acted as an intergovernmental forum to avoid conflict and dysfunctionality between the policies of the provinces and the federation under vertical sharing of power and encouraged cooperative federalism and strengthened provincial autonomy---CCI could also formulate and regulate policies in respect of matters in Part-II of the Federal Legislative List and Constitutional wisdom behind this was to embed and mainstream participatory and cooperative federalism in national governance---Such policies, with Constitutional fiat behind them, may be considered by the Legislature while legislating on subjects falling under Part-II of the Federal Legislative List so that the footprint of Provincial autonomy and Federalism was visible in a proposed legislation which was also a constitutional requirement as Art.142 of the Constitution had been made subject to the Constitution.

Federal system of Government---Concept of "federalism" generally, and under the Constitution of Pakistan---Federal and Provincial authority and distribution of legislative authority---Structure, distribution and redistribution authority under the "Federal Principle" of the Constitution and concept of cooperation, as part of the Constitution---Features of "federalism", extensively explained.

Arts. 142 & 143---Relations between Federation and Provinces---Distribution of Legislative Powers---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Nature, scope and interpretation of Arts.142 & 143 of the Constitution---Cooperative federalism as a tool for interpretation of the Constitution---Subject-matter of Federal and Provincial laws---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Law---Legislative overlap, resolution of---Cooperative / participatory federalism---Scope---Cooperative Federalism, being an intrinsic part of Constitutional design, was also an effective and potent interpretative tool for the courts---Overlap in legislative space between the Federation and the Province and the limits of exclusivity under Art.142 of the Constitution could be resolved through purposive interpretation with said Constitutional purpose in mind---Article 142 of the Constitution opened with words, "subject to the Constitution," which meant that while interpreting said Article, other provisions of the Constitution and foundational Constitutional principles envisaged in the Constitution would take preference over Art.142 of the Constitution---Legislative subjects where there was overlap, had to be contextualized within the Constitutional architecture of Federalism and made to coexist under principles of cooperative federalism---Courts must, therefore, favour functional coexistence of the Federal and Provincial statutes in cases where there was vertical sharing or an overlap of legislative powers---Cooperative federalism flowing through the Constitution helped prevail over and dilute the exclusivity of Art.142 into a more workable and Constitutionally compliant inclusivity; giving both the Legislatures space to co-exist and only in cases of irreconcilable inconsistency between the Federal and Provincial statutes, Art.143 of the Constitution provided a solution, but only as a last recourse.

Arts. 142 & 143---"Federal Principle"---Concept of Federalism in the Constitution---Relations between Federation and Provinces---Distribution of Legislative Powers---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Reading exclusivity of Federal legislative competence under Art.142(a) of the Constitution in situations where there was vertical sharing of legislative power between Federation and Province(s)---Cooperative/participatory federalism, concept of---Cooperative federalism as an intrinsic part of the Constitution of Pakistan---Horizontal and vertical sharing of Legislative powers between the Provinces and Federation---Concept of cooperative federalism prevails over and dilutes legislative exclusivity in Art.142 of the Constitution into a workable and Constitutionally compliant inclusivity---Nature, scope and extent of legislative exclusivity of Art.142 of the Constitution---Application of Art.143 of the Constitution in situations where Federal and Provincial Legislatures were locked in an unavoidable and ineluctable direct conflict---Concept of cooperative / participatory federalism, in the context of legislative powers of the Federation and the Provinces, extensively discussed.


Arts. 142, 143, 141 Preamble & Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No.12----Cooperative/participatory federalism---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions---Question before the High Court was "whether legislative power to set standards in education was exclusivity in the federal legislative domain, or whether subject of "education" falling also in the unwritten Residuary list, empowered Provinces to legislate on the subject"---Held, that while standards in institutions of higher education was a federal legislative subject, it also, indubitably, fell within the larger Provincial legislative subject of "education" and there was therefore an overlap of legislative competence in the area of education and standards of higher education between the Federation and the Provinces---Principle of "cooperative federalism" led to an understanding of Entry No. 12 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution---Federal or national standards by design would always be the baseline minimum national standards, reflective of national integrity and unity and such overarching national architecture of minimum standards provided a baseline for institutions of higher education---Provincial public sector universities and provincial governments exercising their legislative power under the Residuary List were fully empowered to go beyond these minimum standards by setting their own higher standard of excellence and Federation could not stifle or stunt the progress of higher education in the Provinces---In case of vertical power sharing, as in the case of education, federalism encouraged cooperation and interdepartmental coordination, which took the form of participatory or cooperative federalism---Federation could set standards in institutions of higher education, however, they would always pass as minimum or mean standards as they cater to all the public sector universities in the country and simultaneously, the Provinces were fully empowered to develop their own standards in institutions of higher education as long as they were not below the federal standards, which limitation supported national unity and the "federal principle".


PLD  2017 Lahore  830     

 142, 143 & 199---Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, (XXXV of 1973) Ss. 55 & 56 ---Pakistan Bar Council Legal Education Rules, 2015 R. 4---University of Punjab Admission Regulations 2016-2017, Regln. 24---Cooperative federalism---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Educational Institution---Public University---Legal education (LLB)---Admission criteria---Petitioner, which was an affiliated Law College of the University of Punjab, impugned letters issued by the University, whereby students holding third division in their intermediate examinations, were denied admission to LLB, on the ground that students must hold at least a second division to be eligible for admission---Contention of petitioner inter alia was that the Rule 5 of Pakistan Bar Council Legal Education Rules, 2015, framed under Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 did not provide a minimum threshold of second division for LLB program, therefore, the University Regulations, framed under a Provincial Law, could not override the same---Validity---Regulation 24 of the University of Punjab Admission Regulations 2016-2017 included all Bachelors and Masters programs and ineligibility of students holding third division was clearly laid down by the University since the year 2011 and the petitioner, being an affiliated law college , was bound to follow such statutory requirement---Federal law on the subject, catered to all Provinces and set an overarching standard that addressed legal education across the country and Provincial legislature also enjoyed independent legislative space to legislate on legal education under the rubric of education but only to the extent of improving and enhancing the overarching, general, countywide standards in legal education set by the Federal Legislature---Such two powers had been reconciled on the principle of cooperative federalism and Provincial Legislature was free to improve upon standards set by the Federal legislature by setting more robust and stringent standards for admission in the Province---High Court further observed that the Provincial Legislature could not lower standards set by the Federal Legislature and held that the minimum eligibility threshold of second division for admission into LL.B imposed under by the University was in accordance with the Constitution and the law---Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.


 2012  CLD  846     

Art. 143 & Fourth Sched., Federal Legislative List, Item No.29---Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), Ss.122(1)(a) & 122(3)---Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005), Ss.2(c)(ii) & 13---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial law---Laws framed in exercise of authority conferred by Item No. 29 of the Federal Legislative List in the Fourth Sched. to the Constitution, as competent federal legislation prevailed over conflicting provincial legislation under Art. 143 of the Constitution---Provisions of a special law on a subject excluded the application of a general law to such subject.


PLD  2004  Lahore  733     


Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 25, 37, 143 & 199---Examination Reforms and Internal Assessment System for Classes 9, 10, 11 & 12 (2002-2003)---Intra-Court appeal--


 

2004  PLC(CS)  373     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 143 & 199---Constitutional petition---Appointment---Eligibility of candidate---Petitioners/candidates pursuant to an advertisement issued by Public Service Commission, for appointment of Assistant Professors of Surgery, filed applications for such appointment---Petitioners, however. were refused to be interviewed on the ground that because of their tow percentage of marks in M.B.,B.S., they could not be interviewed--Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations, 1985 framed under S.33 of Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, had provided that if a candidate was qualified and had requisite experience, then the merit was to be inter-judged with reference to preferences of priority and first preference was Teaching experience, second preference was practical experience after Post-Graduation and third preference was practical experience before Post-Graduation---Provincial Government had taken the plea that according to Punjab Health Department (Medical and Dental Teaching Posts) Rules, 1979, no provision existed with regard to preference of teaching or practical experience ---Validity--Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations, 1985 framed by Pakistan Medical and Dental Council, in exercise of powers under Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, which was a Federal Statute was in conflict with provisions of Punjab Health Department (Medical and Dental Teaching Posts) Service Rules, 1979 which was a Provincial Statute---Provincial Statute would have to give way to Federal. Statute in view of provisions of Art. 143 of the Constitution---High Court, accepting Constitutional petition, directed that Public Service Commission would evaluate petitioners/candidates strictly in accordance with Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations, 1985 by observing order of preference prescribed therein.


PLD  2003  Lahore  752     

Contstitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.143---Jurisdiction of Health Sciences University---Exemption of Medical Institutions from affiliation---Subject to Art.143 of the Constitution of Pakistan, all the medical institutions under the administrative control of the Provincial Government and the medical institutions in the private sector in the territorial limits of Punjab are under a mandate of the new law to affiliate with the University of Health Sciences within such time and on such terms and conditions which may be prescribed subject of course to the power of the Provincial Government to exempt any medical institution in terms of S.5 of the said Ordinance---Order of exemption of King Edward Medical College, Lahore and Fatima Jinnah Medical College, Lahore is, therefore not without lawful authority.


 2001  PLC(CS)  383     

 143---Constitutional petition---Payment of contribution---Demand notice, issuance-of ---Services of the petitioner had been declared as essential services under the provisions of Pakistan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1952---Contention of the petitioners was that the provisions of Provincial Employees'Social Security Ordinance, 1965, were not applicable and the demand of the contribution under the provincial statute was illegal---Validity---Pakistan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1952, was a federal law applicable to any employment under the Federal Government and to any employment or class of employment to which the Act was made applicable and the same was a special law, whereas Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 was a Provincial law as such not only in view of Art. 143 of the Constitution but also for the reasons that the field was already occupied by a federal and special law, the Ordinance had to give way to the Act---Where there was a declaration by the Federal Government in respect :of employment of the petitioners as essential service under the provisions of Pakistan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1952, notification under S.1(3) of Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, by Provincial Government was not operative qua the petitioner as such the notification was not a lawful exercise of power


2000  MLD  396     

Constitution of Pakistan 1973 ----Art. 143, Sched. IV, Item No.2---Cantonments Act (II of 1924), Ss. 198, 199, 200 & 202---Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Ordinance (XXIII of 1978), Ss.3, 4, 5, 8 & 9---Right to set up a public or private market in Cantonments areas---Special law overrides the general law, principle of---Applicability---Power of Federal Legislature to legislate in respect of the areas forming part of the Cantonment or the power of Provincial Legislature to legislate in respect of those areas in certain cases--Subject of Cantonments, their regulations, constitution and administration was covered by the Federal Legislative List---Provincial Legislature could not legislate in respect of areas covered by Item No.2 of the IVth Sched. to the Constitution---Cantonments Act, 1924 was not only a Federal Law but was also a law which specifically dealt with areas forming part of Cantonments---In view of principle that special law overrides the general law; the Cantonments Act, 1924, must prevail over the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Ordinance, 1978---Right to set up a market in the Cantonments, under the various provisions of the Cantonments Act, 1924 vested in the Cantonment Boards and the Provincial Government could not notify any area of the Cantonment Board to be a market under S.3 of Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Ordinance, 1978---No market could be set up in the Cantonment area except by or with the permission of the Cantonment Board--[Khan Umar Khan v. Market Committee, Jhelum PLD 1972 Lah. 497 dissented from].


 1998  MLD  1411     

Constitution of Pakistan 1973 ----Arts. 142 & 143---Distribution of legislative powers---Scope and application of Arts. 142 & 143, Constitution of Pakistan.


1996  PLC  373     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 143 & 268--Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Law---Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Payment) Act, 1988 being a Provincial law cannot override the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 and West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969 which are Federal Laws mentioned in Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution of Pakistan.


PLD  1995 Lahore   56     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 143---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Laws---Provision of S.24(2) as amended by Provincial Statute and as amended by Federal Statute in respect of the same matter---Mode to resolve inconsistency between Provincial Statute and Federal Statute under Art.143, Constitution of Pakistan---Where any provision of Provincial Statute was in conflict with any provision of Federal Statute, then Federal Law would prevail and Provincial Law, would, to the extent of, repugnancy or conflict, be void---Both the provisions of S.24(2), one amended by Provincial Statute and the other by Federal Statute cannot stand together as the one conferred right of appeal while the other took away said right---Both provisions (as per respective amendments) being in respect of the same matter, the provision of Federal Law have to prevail by virtue of Art. 143 of the Constitution.--[Interpretation of statutes].


 

1995  PLC(CS)  188     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 143---Vires of notification issued under S. 22, Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 (a Provincial Statute) prescribing qualification, for the post of Associate Professor of Medicine on the touchstone of Regulations issued under Medical Council Ordinance, 1962 (Central Statute), prescribing allegedly different qualifications for the same post---Notification issued under S. 22, Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, prescribing qualifications for the said post was not ultra vires in terms of Art. 143 of the Constitution for the reason that petitioner being a civil servant, his appointment was to be governed by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and not through the Regulation issued under S. 33, Medical Council Ordinance, 1962.


 

1995  CLC  1409     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 143 & 199---Vires of Provincial Statute on the touchstone of Federal Statute---Medical and Dental Council constituted under Federal Statute viz Medical Council Ordinance, 1962, had recognised foreign qualifications of a Doctor equivalent to similar qualification obtained from Universities of Pakistan and had recommended to Provincial Government to amend Sched II of Punjab Health Department Medical and Dental Teaching Posts) Service Rules, 1979 (whereby degree of Pakistan Universities has been placed at a higher level than that of equivalent degree obtained from foreign Universities) and bring it at par with its recommendations---Punjab Government declined to do so and for the post of Assistant Professor (Plastic Surgery) it directed Public Service Commission to act in accordance with the Rules of Recruitment framed by it---Public Service Commission called those. candidates for interview who had got their degrees from Pakistan while it did not call for interview doctors holding equivalent qualifications from foreign Universities---Effect---Article 143 of the Constitution envisages that in the event of provision of a statute being repugnant to Federal Statute, provision contained in the latter would prevail and provision of Provincial Statute to the extent of repugnancy would be void---Rule contained in Sched. II, Punjab Health Department (Medical and Dental Teaching Posts) Service Rules, 1979, by which a person duly recognized by the Council functioning under the Federal Statute as having qualifications equivalent or at par or otherwise eligible was placed inferior to persons holding qualifications declared equivalent, was unconscionable unjust, unfair and of no legal effect--Petitioner's qualification being equivalent and at par with other candidate he was entitled to be called for interview and Provincial Government was directed to amend the relevant Rules as per recommendations of Medical Council.


 


1989  PLC(CS)  752     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 143--Notification No.SOR-III-1-6/81, dated 17th October, 1981, issued by Punjab Government amending Punjab Health Department (Medical and Dental Teaching Posts) Service Rules, 1981 in purported exercise of its powers under S.23 of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 being in conflict with provisions of S.33(2) of Medical Council Ordinance, 1962, was ultra vices-Regulations made by Pakistan Medical and Dental Council would prevail and the Provincial Rules to the extent of repugnancy would be void.


PLD  1985  Lahore 358     

Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 268(7), 142 & 143-Regulations published by a Federal Authority and Rules promulgated by Provincial Government = Question whether two standing provisions of viz. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, S. 33 and Punjab Health Department (Medical and Dental Teaching Posts) Service Rules, 1979 could co-exist-Federal law, held, prevailed, and provincial law to the extent of repugnancy was void -Two competing laws when enact two divergent provisions, Federal law must prevail -Two provisions when entirely irreconcilable, repugnancy could be deemed to exist-- New law when abridges some right conferred by existing law or directly or indirectly interfered with such right, repugnancy could be said to be in existence-Regulations framed by Federal Government being


PLD  1978  Lahore  1298     

Arts. 8, 143, 232(4), 233 & 268 read with Arts. 184(3) & 199, Part II, Chap. I and Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908), Ss. 16 & 17-A-Word "void"-Meaning and import-Laws inconsistent with Constitution-Do not die, neither still-born non est or nonexistent nor effaced or obliterated from statute book: Such law exists totally to be applicable to pre-Constitutional matters and also to those to whom Fundamental Rights afford no protection and may re-appear to be operative as soon as Fundamental Rights or supreme law cease to exist-Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, continued in force under Art. 268-Fundamental Rights remain in existence during Proclamation of Emergency but no remedy available during such period in presence of an order under Art. 233(2)-Executive actions contemplated in Art. 233(1) necessarily concern future legislation and not any of void existing laws-Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, inconsistent with Fundamental Right No. 17, void and so unenforceable and, therefore, not available for any e


  

   1975  PCRLJ  1413     

--- S. 2 read with Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 143-Vires of Statutes-Federal Legislature competent to frame law in nature of Removal of Accused Persons Act, 1973-Act, however, could not be interpreted or applied to achieve more than what is necessary for accomplishing removal of accused from one province to another-Transfer of accused-Not made for altering venue of trial or impairing accused's vested rights.

Wednesday, February 24, 2021

Facta Probanda

 Facta Probanda..... Facta Probantia



   Facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue.

Facta probanda   (facts in issue,) 

The material facts relied upon for  claim are called facta probanda 

as stated in the pleadings. 


(1- material facts pleaded/stated in the Plaint. 

2-The material facts on which the party relies for his claim.

3.they must be stated in the pleadings.

4..only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue. 

 5. pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia

      (particulars or evidence).

 

•√  Facta probantia (particulars or evidence)   * (relevant facts)

1-The facts or facts by means of which facta probanda (material facts) are proved .

2-Need not be set out in the pleadings. 

3-They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Difference 

facta probanda (the facts required to be proved i.e. material facts).

Facta probantia (the facts by means of which they are proved i.e. particulars or evidence). It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia. 

But the facts or facts by means of which facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue.


Tuesday, February 16, 2021

Oral Evidence


Click here to Watch lecture.



 QSO, 1984

                        CHAPTER IV       (6)

            ORAL EVIDENCE 

Art. 70. Proof of facts by oral evidence:

 All facts.      ,may be proved by oral evidence. 

                Except..the contents of documents,                                 


Art....71

     1.. Oral evidence must be direct in all cases. 


Seable  fact,  be seen by the witness. 

 * could be heard, it be heard it;

 If it refers to a fact, which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner; 

+ an opinion .. may be proved by  such BASIS formed on documents. 

* if the author of document is dead, 

* or cannot be found,

* or has become incapable of giving evidence, or

 * cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable: 

......................................................


* if oral evidence refers to 

    * the existence or 

    * condition of.  ....any material thing other than a document, 

*the Court may,  require the production of such material thing for its inspection: 

------_---------------------------//////------------------


* If a witness is dead, or

 * can not be found or 

* has become incapable of giving evidence, or 

*his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense

 * The Court regards as unreasonable,

Solution. 

* a party shall have the right to produce, “shahada ala al-shahadah” 

 a witness can appoint two witnesses to depose on his behalf,

 Except in the case of Hudood

Sunday, February 14, 2021

Jurisdiction of Family Court

 


Territorial Jurisdiction of                    Family Court

        (Where wife ordinarily resides)

Section 6 of family court rules 1965, 

Ss. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 of CPC,1908.

Within the local limits of which the wife ordinary resides… family court alone had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all the matrimonial disputes, whataver their nature, irrespective of territorial jurisdiction, provided that the famiy court where the wife resides shall have the jurisdiction to entertain such suits/claims… 

Provisions of section16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 CPC stood excluded from the proceedings before the family court, thus the question of its territorial jurisdiction would never arise, provided that the family court where the wife resides shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all such matter.

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

2019  CLC  1436       KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

   S. 7---Family Courts     Rules, 1965, R. 6---Suit for maintenance---Territorial jurisdiction---Petitioner     assailed judgment and decree passed by Trial Court on the ground of having     no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit---Contention of petitioner was that wife used to reside at place G and she never ordinarily     resided at place K and that as per R. 6 of Family Courts Rules, 1965, the wife could not file a suit for maintenance from the place of her ordinary     residence---Validity---Petitioner himself had approached the Family Court     at place G with a plaint but the said court directed him to approach the     Court having jurisdiction at place K---Petitioner having not challenged     said verdict before any forum, could not be allowed to reopen an already     settled matter, under S. 7 of Family Courts Act, 1964, a plaint for     dissolution of marriage could contain all claims including maintenance,     meaning thereby, that if a wife filed suit for dissolution of marriage from     the place of her ordinary residence, she could combine the prayer of Maintenance     along with other prayers---If     contention of petitioner was admitted that R. 6 of Family Courts Rules,     1965 did not allow the wife to file a suit for maintenance from the place     of ordinary residence, then it would be a contradictory view as to a     clear-cut provision provided under first proviso of S. 7, Family Courts     Act, 1964---Rule 6 was a beneficial rule framed with intention to provide     convenience to a wife, separated from her husband, as such, the relief     given to a wife under said Rule could not be stretched in favour of husband     by forcing her to file a suit for maintenance at his place of     residence---Suit for maintenance was competently filed---Constitutional     petition was dismissed.

Zzzzzzzzzz

Faimly suit can't be dismissed on point territorial jurisdiction...........

   Dismissal of suit for lack of territorial jurisdiction-Words “ordinarily resides”, as used in R.6, West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965-Connotation-Proviso to R.6, West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, enables estranged wife to file suit for dissolution of marriage within local limits of which she ordinarily resides-Petitioner’s husband and parents were resident of different place while she was residing at another place earning her own livelihood, thus, ordinarily residing at a place different from where her parents and husband resided-Words “ such place of her choice would answer to the concept “ordinarily resides “-Petitioner ordinarily residing at a place of her choice, after separation from her husband, was, thus, competent to bring suit for dissolution of marriage in the Court of that place--High Court ordinarily would not go into question of fact in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction but where findings of Courts below on the face of record appeared to be perverse or based on no evidence (as in petitioner’s case) High Court even in Constitutional jurisdiction could take different view-Both Courts below having unlawfully refused to exercise their jurisdiction on wrong assumption that they did not have such jurisdiction, their judgments were set aside and case was remanded to Trial Court 

for decision on merits within specified period.

1997 CLC7 42 

Ref.

PLD 1988 Kar. 602

PLD 1976 Kar. 978

 PLD 1979 SC 864

Zzzzzzzu

Suit for dissolution of marriage can be filled without residence certificate

R. 6---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Territorial jurisdiction of Family Court---Place of residence of wife---Suit filed by wife for dissolution of marriage was returned to wife on the ground that she had failed to produce any document showing her residence at the place where she filed the suit--Validity---Suit for dissolution of marriage or dower, under R.6 of West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, could be filed within local limit where wife ordinarily resided---High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction set aside the orders passed by both the Courts below and case was remanded to Family Court to proceed in accordance with law---Petition was allowed in circumstances.

2010  CLC  403  Kar

Zzzzzzzzzzz

 2012  CLC  24     LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE


Ss. 1(2), 5, Sched. & S.10(4)---West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, R.6---Civil procedure Code (V of 1908), S.83---Pakistan Citizenship Act (II of 1951), S.14(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.1(2) & 199---Constitutional petition---Suit for Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula and recovery of maintenance---Husband's application seeking dismissal of suit by Family Court in Pakistan for lacking jurisdiction to try, same as parties were citizens of State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir---Dismissal of such application and passing of decree for Dissolution of marriage by Family Court for failure of pre-trial conciliation efforts---Validity---According to S.14(b) of Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, a permanent resident of State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir having migrated to Pakistan would be regarded as citizen of Pakistan---Subjects of the State holding Pakistani passports would be deemed to be citizens of Pakistan---

Section 83, C.P.C. provided that an alien, if not falling within definition of an "alien" enemy, could sue in Pakistan---Under S.1(2) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, residence of one party would give jurisdiction to Family Court in Pakistan to entertain such suit even though marriage not solemnized in Pakistan---Suit for Dissolution of marriage according to R.6 of West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965 could be filed in Family Court within whose local limits wife was ordinarily residing, while suit for recovery of maintenance could be filed in Family Court within whose local limits cause of action had arisen wholly or in part---Record showed that wife and her children residing since long in Pakistan were registered citizens of Pakistan holding national identity cards---Cause of action as stated by wife had arisen to her in Pakistan---Wife and her children could invoke and avail jurisdiction of Courts in Pakistan including Family Courts---High Court dismissed constitutional petition in circumstances

Thursday, February 11, 2021

Child Marriage Act

 




PLD 2021 Lahore 21

Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929

          Ss.8 & 2(b) of Act, 1929

Validity of Nikah/marriage where girl had obtained puberty. 

Medical Board constituted by the Court had in its report stated that petitioner was 14/15 years of age and had obtained puberty. 

   Girl who had attained puberty may contract marriage with a man of her choice and was not necessary for such girl to obtain consent of her Wali/Guardian, and in such a case, contention that such marriage/Nikah should not be recognized under Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 had no force.


Petition allowed.

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

Justice Anwaar ul Haq Pannu, Judge of Lahore High Court has delivered a very detailed judgment on child marriages, lacunas in the relevant law, and implementation of existing laws. His lordship has also pointed out the role of Nikah Khawans and in what circumstances their licenses can be canceled. Mr. Pannu has highlighted the side effects of child marriages as well.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

----------------------------------------------------------------

It is observed that during the judicial dispensation, it has oftenly been noticed that as a result of registration of criminal cases in respect of offences under Chapter XVI-A PPC while waging a plea of valid marriage having duly been registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the MFLO’) by one of the parties to the lis, generally contested by the other side or even in absence of registration of criminal cases, the grievance of illegal and undue harassment to the breach of fundamental rights of the aggrieved persons claiming valid marriage, at the hands of police at the behest of the parents, guardians or other relatives of the bride, is found to be voiced and by filing such petitions either the relief of quashing of FIR or issuance of a writ in the nature of prohibition is usually prayed for. Even, in certain cases upon a cursory inquiry it divulges that despite clear legal provisions specifying the eligibility with regard to age limit of the parties to the marriage, the acclaimed marriage is found as having been contracted by violating the provisions of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act 1929”).

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

-----------------------------------------------------------------

It has further been noticed that some of the Nikah Khawans/Nikah Registrars instead of requiring any proof of age from the parties to the marriage which should be in the shape of some authentic document either issued by the NADRA in the form of National Identity Card, B-Form or School leaving Certificate, medical certificate based on ossification test issued by the competent authority and the Birth Certificate validly issued by the Union Council etc, out of their petty temptations knowingly that one of the parties to the marriage is minor, proceed to rely upon a selfdeclaration of the concerned party in respect of his/their age at the time of registration of their marriage.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

Under the Muslim Law the competence of a girl to enter into a contract of marriage is dependent on the attainment of puberty. Puberty is presumed at the age of fifteen years. According to ‘Fatawa Alamgiri’, Page-93 of Vol-V, the lowest age of puberty according to its natural signs, is 12 years in males and 9 years in females and if signs do not appear, both sexes are held to be adult on the completion of their age of 15 years. The principle which after copying out from Fatawa Alamgiri and Hedaya can be deduced is that a girl even having not attained puberty but possessing discretion and sufficient understanding can enter into a contract of marriage however for its operation it will be dependent on the consent of the guardian, if there is one, but in the absence of any guardian it will take effect on her attaining of majority and ratifying the contract. According to Paragraph-274 of Mahomedan Law, “when a marriage is contracted for a minor by any guardian other than the father or father’s father, the minor has the option to repudiate the marriage on attaining the puberty. This is technically called the “option of puberty” (Khyar-ulbulugh). The right of repudiation of the marriage is lost, in the case of a female, if after attaining puberty and after having been informed of the marriage and of her right to repudiate it, she does not repudiate without reasonable delay. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, however, gives her the right to repudiate the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years, provided that the marriage has not been consummated. But in the case of a male the right continues until he has ratified the marriage either expressly or impliedly as by payment of dower or by cohabitation.”

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

At a number of occasions that despite a clear legal requirement of filling in each column of the Nikahnama individually, with specific answer of the parties to the marriage, the Nikah Registrar proceeds to place a single long vertical line against all or some of the columns which amounts to an offence liable to be punished under the law. Such criminal lapse/acts of the Nikah Registrar or the parties, as the case may be, despite being a source of breach of rights of the parties to the marriage are randomly ignored. The unscrupulous elements while taking advantage of such omissions or lapses try to exploit the situation and create serious future complications for the others.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

It may be relevant to observe that in view of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1898, Nikah Registrar is deemed to be a ‘Public Servant’ for criminal prosecution. The status of Nikah Registrar is that of a licensee. He does not fall within the definition of an employee as provided under Section 2(h) of the PEEDA (Punjab employees, efficiency and discipline) Act 2006, therefore, in case of any contravention with any of the provisions of law or violation of any of conditions of the licence, subject to notice, his licence can be revoked/ cancelled by the Union Council.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

A deterrence of punishment for violation of the provisions of Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 has been created. It is quite vivid that the act does not hold the minor responsible for violation of the provision of the Act 1929. It also does not invalidate the marriage itself. It only,, holds certain categories of persons liable for the violations of the provisions of the Act 1929. Under Section 2(a) of Act 1929, child has been defined ‘a person, if male, under 18 years of age and if female, under 16 years of age.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

The trial of the offence under the provisions of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 is to be held by a Family Court exercising the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class in accordance with the Provisions of Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964).

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

The registration of the marriage shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance and the Rules. For registration of Nikah/marriage, the Union Council has been authorized to issue a license to one or more persons who are fit and proper to solemnize the Nikah, on his/their application who are called as Nikah Registrars. The Nikah Registrar is under obligation to fill in accurately every column of the Nikahnama individually with specific answers of the bride and the bridegroom. Any violation/contravention with the provisions of the Ordinance is punishable with simple imprisonment and fine. The record of the marriage in respect of marriage registration is to be maintained by the Union Council. The copy of Nikahnama shall be supplied to the parties.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

It is a matter of great concern that despite ninety years of the promulgation of the Act, 1929, its objectives could not have been achieved satisfactorily due to certain lapses or loopholes in the mechanism for its enforcement. The children are still being lured by unscrupulous elements through deceitful means to abuse their innocent souls. It is also relevant to point out that although under The Majority Act, 1875 (Act XX of 1875) (hereinafter known as ‘Majority Act’) a person is said to attain majority at the age of eighteen years. However, in case of appointment of his guardian by the Court, the age of majority of such a Ward is twenty-one years. The application of the above provisions has however been excluded insofar as the operation of personal law in respect of marriage, divorce and dower is concerned. Every other person, subject to as aforesaid, domiciled in Pakistan shall be deemed to have attained his majority on completion of his age of eighteen years, and not before. A Muslim though under 18 years on attaining puberty, can bring a suit relating to marriage, dower and divorce without next friend.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

------------------------------------------------------------------

Directions issued to Nikah Registrars

(1) All the Nikah Registrars or other persons, who solemnize marriages are under legal obligation to scrutinize the credentials at the time of Nikah as to whether the marriage is solemnized with the free will of the parties and no child is exposed to marriage. Mere submission of oral entries for the purpose of age should not be accepted unless any proof of age from the parties to the marriage preferably which should be in the shape of some authentic document either issued by the NADRA in the form of National Identity Card, B-Form or School Leaving Certificate, Medical Certificate based on ossification test issued by the competent authority and the Birth Certificate validly issued by the Union Council, etc. is produced.

(2) Furthermore, after perusing the record in compliance with SOP (ii) mentioned in para 17, in case the Authority fails to take the requisite action, it will be deemed that he himself has willfully failed to perform his function/duty amounting to negligence rendering himself liable for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him under the relevant law.

PLD 2020 Lahore 811

Monday, February 8, 2021

Citations 2020

  

  



 PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 728 (DB)

                 [D.I. Khan Bench]


Present: Syed Muhammad Attique Shah and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ.


MUHAMMAD AZEEM--Appellant


versus


STATE and another--Respondents


Crl. A. No. 68-D of 2016, decided on 28.1.2019.


Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)--


----S. 302(b)--Sentence--Challenge to--Offence of murder--Murder of appellant’s wife in his house may be a circumstance to be taken into account along with other prosecution evidence--However, this may by itself not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt in absence of any other evidence of prosecution connecting him with crime--Some part of onus had shifted to accused to explain circumstances under which his wife met unnatural death in his house on fateful night, but he had failed to discharge that part of onus--Prosecution has miserably failed to prove guilt of accused through positive and cogent evidence--In instant case, mental state of convict during previous trial at time of framing of charge is relevant--He did not defend his case and pleaded guilty--In his statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C., he stated that for last so many years he is suffering from mental disease and was under influence of his mental disease and was unable to understand proceedings of Court--After going through opinion of medical board, that convict was not able to understand proceedings of Court at time of framing of charge during earlier trial and was not aware of consequences of admission of guilt, therefore, this would be of no help to prosecution to prove guilt of accused--Evidence of recovery of axe P-2 from crime scene is of no consequence for determining guilt of appellant, reason being that axe was found lying on crime scene--It was neither recovered at instance of accused nor it belonged to him, so it cannot be presumed that it was appellant who had used axe for inflicting injuries. [Pp. 733, 734 & 735] A, C, D, E & F


Criminal Jurisprudence--

----Principle--Legal obligation--Principle of criminal jurisprudence is that prosecution is under legal obligation to prove its case against accused beyond a ray of doubt--Such burden remains throughout and does not shift to shoulder of accused, who is only burdened to prove a defence plea.    [P. 733] B


Medical Evidence--


----It is by now settled that medical evidence neither identify assailant nor pin point accused, at most it reflects seat of injury, duration and weapon used in commission of offence and cause of death.      [P. 735] G


2017 SCMR 986 and PLD 2007 SC 637 ref.


Abscondence--


----Abscondence of accused, no doubt accused remained absconder for more than eight years, however it is by now settled that abscondence can never remedy defects in prosecution case as it is not indicative of guilt--People do abscond out of fear to be killed in retaliation or to avoid police torture and duress.        [P. 735] H


PLD 1977 SC 41.


Mr. Saif-ur-Rahman Khan, Advocate for Appellant.


Mr. Hidayat Ullah Malana, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.


Mr. Kamran Hayat Miankhel, Additional A.-G. for State.


Date of hearing: 28.1.2019.


Judgment


Shakeel Ahmad, J.--Muhammad Azeem aged about 44/45 years son of Baran was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Dera Ismail Khan for having murdered of his wife Mst. Zaroba Bibi, in his house in village Buzdar, District D.I. Khan, at a distance of 40/42 kilometers from Police Station Chowdawan on 20.12.2009 in the small hours of night. Initial report Ex. PW-3/1, in shape of murasila, was recorded at Civil Hospital, Dera Ismail Khan, on the same day at about 16 hours by Umer Daraz Inspector (PW-2) on the statement of Ghulam Rasool (PW-8) uncle of the deceased, subsequently, incorporated into FIR Ex. PW-8/1. Learned trial Judge convicted Muhammad Azeem under Section 302(b), P.P.C. and awarded sentences as follows:


Under Section 302(b), P.P.C.--Sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. He was further directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/-(rupees five lac) to the legal heirs of the deceased as compensation as provided under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., failing which he has been directed to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to convict/appellant.


The convict has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence.


2. According to FIR, on 21.12.2009, at 16.00 hours, the complainant Ghulam Rasool along with dead body of his niece Mst. Zaroba Bibi wife of appellant/convict, reported the matter to the police in emergency room of DHQ, Hospital, D.I. Khan stating that at about 7.30 a.m., he received information of the incident in his home, upon such information, he along with Sher Muhammad (his cousin) and Zain-ud-Din (his nephew) rushed to the crime scene and found the dead body of Mst. Zaroba Bibi in the residential room of the accused/convict, on query the inmates of the home disclosed that she has been murdered by her husband namely Muhammad Azeem (appellant) at small hours of night by giving her axe blows, he charged the accused/convict for committing murder of his niece.


3. After recording the FIR Sattar Khan S.I (PW-10) reached the crime scene along with police party, on the following day, prepared site plan Ex. P-B at the instance of complainant. Blood stained earth P-1 and blood stained axe P-2 were also taken into possession by him vide recovery memo Ex.PW-10/1 and Ex.PW-10/2, took into possession blood stained garments of the deceased Ex.P-3 vide recovery memo Ex.PW-10/4, conducted search of the house of accused vide memo Ex.PW-10/3 and recorded statements of PWs including parents of and brothers of the convict, received PM documents of deceased along with plastic jar containing swabs of deceased sealed these items into parcel No. 4 Ex.P-4 vide memo Ex.PW-1/1, also recorded supplementary statement of the complainant, whereafter, he handed over the case file to local police of Police Station Chaudawan.


4. At the trial the prosecution examined fourteen witnesses. Lady Doctor Khurshid Bhittani, who had conducted autopsy, appeared as PW-6. She noted following injuries on her person.


External Appearance


A young lady wearing printed Qameez and pink Shalwar with pink Dopata, ear rings, nose pin of gold Rigor mortis developed.


Wound


All the incised wounds and crushed on the left side of the face. There was fractured of nose, upper lip cut and cheek brekented. There was fractured of mandible jaw. All the cheeks, nostrils of nose cut.


The doctor opined that death had occurred due to injury to vital organs, injury by sharp weapon leading to shock, coma and death. According to her, duration between injury and death 10 to 20 minutes while duration between death and postmortem, 12 to 14 hours. Ghulam Rasool (PW-8) narrated the facts given by him in the FIR. Ghulam Qadir (PW-9) stated that deceased Zaroba Bibi was his sister. He had gone to Karachi for earning livelihood. There he was informed telephonically about the murder of his sister by convict. In pursuance thereof, he left Karachi for D.I. Khan and reached on the following morning at about 8.00 a.m. when he reached to his house, found dead body of his sister. He inquired about the incident from inmates of the house, who disclosed that Azeem Khan had committed murder of deceased with axe and decamped from the spot. He was examined by the I.O, wherein he charged the accused for committing murder of his sister. Safdar HC, who appeared as PW-14 stated of having witnessed the recovery of axe P-2, lastly worn garments of the deceased stained with blood Ex.P-3.


5. The accused when examined after close of prosecution evidence denied the charge and pleaded innocence. He did not produce any evidence in defence.


6. The prosecution case depended on the testimony of PW-8 and 9, namely Ghulam Rasool (uncle of the deceased) Ghulam Qadir (brother of the deceased). Recovery of blood stained earth and blood stained axe from crime scene, recovery of dead body of Mst. Zaroba Bibi from the house of the convict, medical evidence plead guilty of the appellant in previous trial and abscondence of accused.


7. Learned counsel for the appellant while criticizing the testimony of PWs-8 and 9 contended that they did not witness the occurrence, there statement is based on hearsay, therefore, not be relied upon for conviction of appellant. He next contended that recoveries of axe and blood stained earth is not reliable and be excluded from consideration. He further contended that medical evidence does not connect the appellant with the alleged crime. He lastly contended that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant was owner and in exclusive possession of the house where alleged murder was committed and prayed for outright acquittal of the accused.


8. As against that, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant argued that the complainant and PW-9 Ghulam Qadir has no ill will to falsely depose against the appellant. He next urged that circumstances established that prosecution has proved its case against the appellant beyond a ray of doubt. He lastly argued that after commission of offence the accused remained at large for quite sufficient time, which proves his guilty, conscious and prayed for dismissal of appeal.


9. The learned A.A.G representing the State added that the recoveries of implicating material from the spot and medical evidence fully corroborates the statement of PW-9 and 10, he concluded that prosecution has proved its case against the appellant beyond a ray of doubt and prayed to maintain the impugned judgment.


10. We have carefully gone through the evidence on record and have heard the learned counsel for the parties with their eminent assistance.


11. Perusal of the record reflects that the crime in this case had taken place in odd hours/small hours of the fateful night at unknown time in the 2nd last week of December. The crime scene was inside house of the appellant. The FIR of the incident was lodged at 16 hours and according to site plan (Ex.P-B) there was other houses situated close to the house of occurrence.


12. We found in the deposition of PW-8 Ghulam Rasool that he was informed by a child, who had came from the house of the accused, about the incident, when he was present in his house along with Zain-uddin and Sher Muhammad, on receipt of this information he rushed to the crime scene alongwith the said Zain-uddin and Sher Muhammad, where they found the dead body of the deceased and blood stained axe. They inquired about the incident from the inmates of the house, who unanimously disclosed that the deceased Mst. Zroba Bibi was done to death by his husband (appellant) by means of axe. Admitteldy, Ghulam Rasool (PW-8) and Ghulam Qadir (PW-9) are not the eye-witnesses of the alleged occurrence, their statement is based on the information furnished to them, by the inmates of the house, therefore, it can safely be held that their statements were based

on hearsay and being not hit by Article 71 of Qanun-e­Shahadat

Order, 1984, is not admissible which says that oral evidence must be direct. It was deposed by Sattar Khan S I (PW-10) that he had recorded the statement of parents and brothers of the appellant, but astonishingly, during trial they were not produced as witnesses to corroborate the statement of complainant, Sher Muhammad and Zain-uddin. They have been abandoned for no good reasons.


A13. The allegation of the prosecution that murder of the appellant’s wife in his house may be a circumstance to be taken into account along with other prosecution evidence. However, this may by itself not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt in the absence of any other evidence of the prosecution connecting him with the crime. The prosecution has failed to establish that the house where the murder was committed was in absolute and exclusive possession of the accused as we found in the deposition of Ghulam Rasool (PW-8) that he found other inmates of the house when he visited the crime scene.


BC14. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that prosecution is under legal obligation to prove its case against the accused beyond a ray of doubt. This burden remains throughout and does not shift to the shoulder of accused, who is only burdened to prove a defence plea. Therefore, contention of the learned counsel for the complainant that some part of the onus had shifted to the appellant to explain the circumstances under which his wife met unnatural death in his house on the fateful night, but he had failed to discharge that part of the onus. We have considered this aspect of the case and found that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the accused through positive and cogent evidence. In this context we are fortified by the judgment reported as Nasrullah alias Nasro v. The State (2017 SCMR 724) and Asad Khan the State (PLD 2017 SC 681), wherein it has been held that:


“The above mentioned shifting of same point of the onus to the accused may not be relevant in a case where the entire case of the prosecution itself is not reliable and where the prosecution fails to produce any believable evidence.”


15. In this behalf reference may also be made to the case reported as Abdul Majeed v. The State (2011 SCMR 941), wherein it has been observed that:


“In the absence of direct or substantial evidence the conviction of a person cannot be sustained merely on account of failure to explain the murder of his wife in his house”.


In this context reliance can also be placed on the case reported as Umer Zaman v. The State (2013 PCr.LJ 708).


16. Now adverting to contention of the learned counsel for the complainant that in earlier trial the accused had pleaded guilty and was convicted and sentenced. However, in appeal his conviction and sentence was set aside by this Court and case was remanded with the direction to frame charge against the accused/appellant afresh by recording his plea of guilty in his own words and then decide the case afresh after recording evidence of the prosecution and statement of appellant vide judgment dated 30.05.2015, after remand, the accused/appellant on 04.07.2012 submitted an application before the learned trial Court for his examination by the medical board as he is suffering from mental disorder, his request was acceded to on 04.07.2012, whereafter, he was examined by the Standing Medical Board and opined as under:


“That the accused has a past history of psychotic illness with depression. He still exhibit, disturbed behavior abnormally of thinking and perceptual abnormalities. The Standing Medical Board is of the opinion that he needs treatment with ante-psychotic medication. At the moment he does not understands the proceedings of the Court, nature of his offence its consequence therefore, he is unfit to plead in the Court of law. The board would review him after one year during this period he needs to be in a secure place like prison”.


17. After receipt of opinion of Medical Board, the learned trial Court, postponed the trial for a period of one year vide order dated 12.12.2012, after lapse of one year, he was again examined by the Medical Board on 13.03.2014 and furnished following opinion.


The Standing Medical Board is of the opinion that the accused suffers from Chronic schizophrenia which is a major mental illness. The accused has responded to medication and has made significant recovery. The Standing Medical Board is of the opinion that at the moment he is very well communicative, coherent and rational. He understands the nature of his crime, its consequences Court proceedings and therefore is fit to plead in the Court of law. However since schizophrenic illness is chronic and relapsing condition the accused needs treatment with anti-psychotic medication for foreseeable future. The honourable Court may dispose off his case under relevant section of mental health act.


Whereafter, proceedings were restored and trial commenced.


D18. In the instant case, the mental state of the convict during previous trial at the time of framing of charge is relevant. He did not defend his case and pleaded guilty. In his statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C., he stated that for the last so many years he is suffering from mental disease and on 23.08.2011, he was under the influence of his mental disease and was unable to understand the proceedings of the Court. His contention leads support from medical evidence.


E19. After going through the opinion of medical board, we are of the considered view that convict was not able to understand the proceedings of the Court at the time of framing of charge during earlier trial and was not aware of the consequences of admission of guilt, therefore, this would be of no help to the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused.


F20. The evidence of recovery of axe P-2 from the crime scene is of no consequence for determining the guilt of the appellant, the reason being that the axe was found lying on the crime scene. It was neither recovered at the instance of the accused nor it belonged to him, so it cannot be presumed that it was the appellant who had used the axe for inflicting the injuries.


21. Safdar Hussain while appearing as PW-14 deposed about having witnessed recovery of blood stained earth, axe P-2 form the spot and lastly worn garments of deceased Ex. PW-3, but did not say anything about the occurrence.


G22. The learned trial Court while convicting the accused sought corroboration from medical evidence. It is by now settled that medical evidence neither identify the assailant nor pin point the accused, at the most it reflects the seat of the injury, duration and weapon used in the commission of offence and cause of death. In this behalf reliance can be placed on the case reported as Hashim Qasim and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 986) and Abdul Majeed v. Mulazim Hussain and others (PLD 2007 SC 637).


H23. Adverting to abscondence of the accused, no doubt the accused remained absconder for more than eight years, however it is by now settled that abscondence can never remedy the defects in the prosecution case as it is not indicative of guilt. People do abscond out of fear to be killed in retaliation or to avoid police torture and duress. In this respect reference may be made to the case reported as Mehar Khan and others v. The State (PLD 1977 SC 41).


24. For the reasons noted above, doubts have arisen in our mind and we feel that it would not be safe to maintain conviction of the appellant. This appeal is, therefore, allowed and the appellant is acquitted by way of grant of benefit of doubt. He shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case.


25. Above are the reasons of our short order of even date.


(A.A.K.)          Appeal allowed

Sunday, February 7, 2021

Exparte Decree

#hklegaltv

   Remedies against ex parte decree.

                     (2000 SCMR 296)

1- An application under Order 9, Rule 13

2- A review application u/s 114

3- An appeal u/s 96

4- A proceeding to set aside the decree on the ground that it has been obtained by fraud etc. u/s 12(2)CPC

5- An application for re-hearing of the matter on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice

            (PLD 1972 Lah. 603 FB)

6- A revision may also lie .

               (1995 CLC 516)

7- In appropriate cases the inherent powers of a court may also be attracted

 (PLD 2003 SC 625) or 

a writ may lie (1986 CLC 2515

8,-LIMITATION......2014 Y L R 425

Wednesday, February 3, 2021

Additional Evidence

 



Additional Evidence 

2016  SCMR  2067 

O. XLI, R. 27---Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court---Scope---Power of Appellate Court to require any (additional) document or examination of witnesses enabling it to pronounce its judgment did not mean that the Court shall provide a delinquent with a chance to make up for his omission and fill up the lacuna of his case and allow additional evidence particularly in the circumstances when neither in the grounds of appeal a case for additional evidence had been set out nor any independent formal application had been moved for the purposes of producing additional evidence . 

Power under the provisions of O. XLI, R. 27, C.P.C. for allowing available additional evidence was not unfettered nor did the Appellate Court have the discretion to allow additional evidence per its own caprice, rather such discretion was structured/limited by the factors enunciated in the said provisions i.e., where the Court from whose decree the appeal had been preferred had refused to admit any evidence which it ought to have admitted. 

Zzzzzzzzzzzzz

2016  MLD  840  Lah

O. XLI, R. 27---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Scope---Trial Court dismissed the suit against which appeal was filed wherein an application for production of additional evidence was moved by the plaintiffs which was accepted by the Appellate Court---Contention of plaintiffs was that documents which were to be produced were not traceable at the time of recording of evidence before the Trial Court---Validity---Sufficient explanation had been put forth by the plaintiffs for not producing the documents during trial---Appellate Court had correctly exercised jurisdiction and had committed no illegality or irregularity---Revision was dismissed in circumstances. 

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

2016  CLCN  36  Lah

O. XLI, R.27---Appeal---Application for production of

 additional evidence ---Validity---Evidence for determination of point in issue was not required by court---Such application was dismissed in circumstances. 


2015  SCMR  58  

O. XLI, R. 27---additional evidence before Appellate Court---Supreme Court, jurisdiction of--- Scope--- Authentic documentary evidence consistent with the pleadings and relevant to the findings of the case---additional evidence facilitating resolution of controversy---Such additional evidence was admissible on record in the Appellate Court---Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to do complete justice between the parties favoured additional evidence to be admitted in order to meet the ends of justice.


2015  MLD  666 Lah

O.XLI, R.27 & O.VII, R.14---additional evidence , production of---Scope---additional evidence could be permitted by the court if same was helpful for the court to decide the matter in issue. 


2015  CLC  719  Lah

O. XLI, R. 27---Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court---Scope---Parties to an appeal were not entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary in the appellate court except when the court from whose decree the appeal was preferred had refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or appellate court required any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial reason---Defendants had not lodged any application for additional evidence before the Trial Court or before the lower Appellate Court in first round of litigation---Proposed documents were not necessary to resolve the real matter in controversy between the parties---Appellate Court had rightly refused the application for additional evidence through a well reasoned order.


2015  YLR  2191  Kar

O. XLI, R. 27---Production of additional evidence , pending appeal---Scope---Party, if not having availed opportunity to produce evidence in Trial Court, could not be allowed at appellate stage to improve upon or fill up lacunas or omissions in his case---Mistaken legal advice or negligence of party or his counsel or un-intentional inadvertence of his counsel to bring evidence on record at proper stage would not be a good cause for allowing additional evidence at appellate stage---Principles. 


2015  CLC  54  Kar

O. XLI, R. 27---Production of additional evidence at appellate stage---Object---Wisdom of provisions of O.XLI, R.27, C.P.C. was to provide an adequate opportunity to the parties to adduce additional evidence by producing necessary documents or witnesses which were either not available or could not be produced due to unavoidable circumstances but such production of documents or witnesses was necessary to decide the controversy to meet the ends of justice. 


2014  YLR  1350  Lah

O. XLI, R. 27---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Suit for declaration---Production of additional evidence before the Appellate Court---Scope---Justice at no cost and at no stage would be allowed to fall prey of technicalities which might be ignored if they would tend to create hurdles in the same---Discretion exercised by the Appellate Court was according to settled provisions of law which was neither perverse nor arbitrary---Revision was not maintainable which was dismissed in circumstances---Appellate Court was directed to decide the appeal after requisitioning the relevant record. 


2014  MLD  1148  Lah

O. XLI, R. 27---Production of evidence in appellate court---Grounds---additional evidence could be produced on the grounds that the court from whose decree appeal was preferred had refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or the Appellate Court required any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. 


2013  CLC  1655  Pesh

O. XLI, R. 27---Powers of Appellate Court for recording of additional evidence ---Appellate court could exercise suo motu powers for bringing on record additional evidence and even in exceptional cases such power was allowed to be exercised at revisional stage---additional evidence should have been a direct, and important bearing on the main issue in the case and that too to prevent miscarriage of justice, however, such power could not be exercised where the disputed document was not relied upon or tendered in the trial court. 


2013  CLC  1054  Lah

O. XLI, R. 27---additional evidence , production of---Scope---Such evidence could be allowed, if court itself required same for reaching at right conclusion of case. 


2013  CLC  1789  Kar

O. XIII, R. 2---Production of additional evidence at subsequent stage of proceedings---Object and Scope---Rationale behind O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C. was to prevent fraud and not penalize parties for non-production of documents and in such regard, there was no hard and fast rule but the matter was left open to the discretion of the court to decide on the same based upon sound judicial principles depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case---If there was no doubt as to the authenticity of documents sought to be produced, then an application under O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C. ought not to be discarded lightly as rules and procedure were intended to advance the cause of justice rather than to obstruct same---Mere delay in filing of an application under O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C. would not be a reasonable ground or sufficient cause to disentitle the production of such documents/evidence as the same would amount to a negation of O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C. which was especially designed to remedy such a situation---Application for permission to produce documents and/or additional evidence may be filed at any stage when the genuineness of such documents was beyond any shadow of doubt and the same ought not to be shut out of evidence if produced at a later stage. 


2012  SCMR  1258  

O. XLI, R.27---Appellate Court failing to record additional evidence which is essential for just decision of the case---Effect---Such act on the part of the Appellate Court amounted to exercising jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. 


2012  CLC  165  Pesh

O. XLI, R. 27---Production of additional evidence at appellate stage---Scope---Party desiring to produce such evidence could be permitted only for specific reasons mentioned in O.XLI, R.27, C.P.C. 


 PLD  2011  SC  151 

Art. 185---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLI, R. 27---additional evidence ---Supreme Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---On the authority / power of Supreme Court to do complete justice and allowing additional evidence , there cannot be any cudgel, however, such power should not be exercised as a matter of course to favour a delinquent litigant, rather than in genuine cases---additional evidence can only be allowed by court when it is in consonance with, and within the scope of pleadings of parties and not otherwise. 


 2011  YLR  2314  Lah

O. XIII, R.2---Production of document as additional evidence ---Party, to a civil suit, could be permitted to produce additional evidence , when important evidence having a material bearing on the merits of the suit, was subsequently discovered; the document sought to be produced in additional evidence was not in its knowledge; the document was not available with it and that such document was beyond its control---Power to allow evidence was discretionary, circumscribed by the limitation; and it should not be allowed where a party had been grossly negligent--Inadvertence, mistaken legal advice, ignorance of law or negligence of a party, were not grounds for allowing additional evidence.


 2009  YLR  125  Lah

O. XLI, R.27---Production of additional evidence ---Application under O.XLI, R.27, C.P.C. for production of additional evidence had been dismissed---Validity---Documents sought to be produced in additional evidence were registered documents and certified copies of 'the Revenue Record and as such were part of public record---Suit was decided after almost nine years and appeal filed was Pending---Since the documents sought to be produced as additional evidence , were part of public record, those were allowed to be produced as additional evidence as there was no possibility of their being tampered with---Appellate Court was directed by High Court to allow the production of documents mentioned in application and decide appeal within specified period. 


2009  CLC  420  Kar

O.XLI, R.27(1)---Application for production of additional evidence ---Duty of Court---Court would be bound to record reasons only in case of allowing such evidence, but not otherwise---Principles. 


2007  SCMR  1117  

---O. XLI, R.27---Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court---Scope---additional evidence would be sought about something which happened to have been omitted by a party during trial---Appellate Court could admit additional evidence , if same would promote ends of justice and would be required for doing complete justice between parties---Question of filing in lacunae would not be of prime importance---Principles. 


2007  YLR  2462  Lah

O. XLI, R.27---Application for production of additional evidence ---Not necessary that such application should be decided separately and  not along with main appeal. 


2006  CLC  1790   Lah

---0. XIII, R.2 & O.XLI, R.27---Production of additional evidence --additional evidence could be allowed at any stage and prayer for the same could not be turned down merely on the ground that same was being made at a belated stage, but before allowing such application, it was a requirement of law that non-production of evidence at the relevant stage must be reasonably explained and unless Court was satisfied that there was sufficient/good cause for non-production of evidence at the appropriate stage in terms of O.XIII, R.2, C.P.C., and that production of such additional evidence at a belated stage was essential to pronounce judgment; or any other sufficient cause within the meanings of O.XLI, R.27, C.P.C., was shown, same could not be allowed to be produced at the whim and desire of the litigant just to enable him to fill up the lecuna.


2005  SCMR  1231     

---O.XLI, R.27---Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court could be allowed only in exceptional circumstances---Circumstances explained. The additional evidence can be allowed only in exceptional circumstances in a case in which the evidence required to be brought on record was essential for the just decision of the case and such evidence either was not available or was beyond the reach of the party concerned at the relevant time or if pertaining to the official record was not in his knowledge. 


PLD. 2005 Kar  478 

----O. XLI, R. 27 & S. 151---Production of additional evidence ---High Court, in the interest of justice and all the parties concerned allowed applications for production of additional evidence so that documents now placed on record may be taken into consideration by High Court to record just and equitable conclusion in respect of controversy involved in the appeals. 


PLD 2002 SC 615

----O. XLI, R.27 & S.96---Additional evidence, recording of ---Jurisdiction of High Court in appeal---Filing of application for recording of additional evidence---Requirement---High Court was fully competent under O.XLI, R.27, C.P.C. to direct additional evidence for a just and proper determination of the issue even without application by the parties---Power to allow additional evidence was always discretionary in nature and the exercise of discretion would depend on the facts of each case and as a general rule parties to a lis were not entitled to produce additional evidence but if the Appellate Court required any documents to be produced or any witness to be examined to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, it could always do so after recording reason

Fasad-fil-Arz

                     No Bail                     Fasad-fil-Arz                       2024 LHC 3700      An offence committed in the name or ...